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Trade Secrets Registry
Chagai Vinizky
I.

Introduction

Modern legal systems provide two main mechanisms for
protecting inventions: patents and trade secrets.1 Although the
public is more familiar with patent law, the use of trade secret
protection is on the rise.2 This observation is supported by
empirical studies showing that manufacturers engaged in
research and development in the U.S. do not regard the patent
system as an effective way to protect inventions, whereas the
system of trade secrets and the use of other means are perceived
as being more efficient.3 Nevertheless, this does not mean that


This article is based on the author’s doctoral dissertation, entitled “Trade
Secrets Registry” under the guidance of Professor Shalom Lerner, Bar-Ilan
University Faculty of Law. I wish to thank Dr. Amos Herman and my
colleagues who participated in the department seminars at Sha’arei Mishpat
Law School and at the Bar-Ilan University Law School, and those who
participated in the annual workshop of the Israeli Academic Forum for
Intellectual Property for their useful comments. I am especially indebted to
Professor Gideon Parchomovsky for his invaluable contribution.
 Dr. Chagai Vinizky is Assistant Professor, Sha’arei Mishpat College of Law,
Hod Hasharon, Israel.
1. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 50 (8th ed. 2011);
Josh Lerner, Introduction to the Economics of Trade Secrets, HARV. BUS. SCH.,
http://www.people.hbs.edu/jlerner/TSintro.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
2. Bruce T. Atkins, Note, Trading Secrets in the Information Age: Can
Trade Secret Law Survive the Internet?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1996);
Robert G. Bone, Exploring the Boundaries of Competitive Secrecy: An Essay on
the Limits of Trade Secrets Law, in LAW, INFORMATION & INFORMATION TECH.
99, 100 (Eli Lederman & Ron Shapira eds., 2001); Michael A. Epstein & Stuart
D. Levi, Protecting Trade Secret Information: A Plan for Proactive Strategy, 43
BUS. LAW. 887, 887 (1988); James W. Hill, Trade Secrets, Unjust Enrichment,
and the Classification of Obligations, 4 VA. J. L. & TECH. 2, 2 (1999). For
extensive usage of this defense in the computer industry, see Gale R. Peterson,
Trade Secrets in an Information Age, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 385, 386-87 (1995).
3. Thus, for example, a study conducted in 1994 of 1,478 manufacturers
engaged in research and development in the U.S. concluded that a patent was
not considered an efficient way to protect inventions, as compared to trade
secrets and lead time that were noted as the most efficient means. Moreover,
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there is a clear preference for either one of the two methods.
Most researchers in the field are of the opinion that these
methods are complementary, i.e., in some cases it is better for
inventors to choose the patent method, and in others the method
of the trade secret law. The choice often depends on the type of
invention and the individual circumstances of the case.4 A
survey of the legal and economic considerations that the
inventor needs to weigh when deciding between the two methods

the companies’ appraisal of the efficiency of trade secrets rose dramatically
compared to the study conducted in 1983, to the point where this means
became the leading one for the protection of inventions. Wesley M. Cohen,
Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets:
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or
Not) 6, 9, 13, 24, 28, Figure 1-2 & Table 4-5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working
Paper
No.
7552,
2000),
available
at
www.nber.org/papers/w7552.v5.pdf. For the study from 1983, see Richard C.
Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development (Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 862 (1988)), available at
http://dido.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d08b/d0862.pdf. Another study from 1995 of 95
companies in the field of semiconductors concluded that there is a paradox in
that on one hand there are grounds for the registration of patents in this
industry but on the other hand the companies tend to rely more on trade
secrets and other means rather than patents in order to realize a return on
their investment in research and development. The paradox is explained,
among others, in that the accumulation of patents serves as a type of
bargaining chip in the negotiations for the rights to use the technologies of
other companies, which is necessary for technological advancement in this
industry. Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox
Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the US Semiconductor Industry,
1979-95, 32 J. ECON. 101, 102 (2001); see also Vincenzo Denicolo & Luigi
Alberto Franzoni, Patents, Secrets, and the First-Inventor Defense, 13 J. ECON.
& MGMT. STRATEGY 517, 517-18 (2004).
4. WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 359, 420 (2003); Cohen et al., supra note 3;
Epstein & Levi, supra note 2, at 887-88; David D. Friedman, William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade Secrets Law, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 61, 62-64 (1991); Lerner, supra note 1; Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature
and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & ECON. 275 (1977); Edmund W.
Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 683, 690 n.21 (1980). However, there are those who believe that the
protection afforded to trade secrets should be limited. See Alan Hyde, The
Wealth of Shared Information: Silicon Valley’s High-Velocity Labor Market,
Endogenous Economic Growth, and the Law of Trade Secrets (Sept. 1998),
http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~hyde/WEALTH.htm. As to the opinion which
says that trade secrets law should be repealed in all but some exceptional
cases, see Bone, supra note 2, at 121; Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade
Secrets Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 303-04
& n.281 (1998).
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is beyond the scope of this article.
The present article considers four aspects in which the trade
secret method is less efficient than the patents method:
litigation costs, transaction costs, financing costs, and
employment costs. The main part of the article is devoted to the
proposal of establishing a particular type of trade secrets
registry, with the intention that it will reduce the abovementioned costs and will improve the efficiency of the trade
secret method. I propose a structure for the registration of trade
secrets that is likely to solve most of the problems left unresolved
by the escrow companies and the Indonesian legislation. A trade
secret registry may seem to be a contradiction in terms, because
the purpose of a registry is to make public the information
registered with it, whereas trade secrets must be kept
confidential. But the proposed registry integrates these two
principles, so that a part of it remains confidential and another
part is open to the public. As part of the registry, trade secrets
would be deposited confidentially through coded communication,
including dating of the deposit. But, the identity of the holders
of the rights with respect to these secrets (including those
possessing secondary rights, such as licensees and holders of a
mortgage) and the identity of those bound by confidentiality
regarding the secrets deposited (such as employees of the owner
of the trade secret) will be public information. The proposed
registry would be handled by the registrar of trade secrets, a
quasi-judicial figure empowered to resolve judicial disputes
when necessary.
II. The Costs of Litigating Claims of Patent Infringement and
Trade Secret Misappropriation
When an invention is protected by patent, the initial cost of
litigating infringement suits should be lower than the cost of
bringing a trade secrets appropriation suit. Although a patent
is vulnerable to direct and indirect attack,5 the starting point is
5. Any person may request the nullification of a patent (direct attack)
within nine months from the date of its registration, on the grounds that the
invention was not suitable for registration as a patent from the outset. See 35
U.S.C. § 321 (2012). Additionally, a common argument in defense of a claim of
breach of patent is that the invention was not suitable for registration as a
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that patent holders are entitled to the protection of their rights.
Moreover, in the case of a patent, the scope of the protection
must be defined clearly in the patent claims. Therefore, there is
no need to begin the proceedings with the question of the scope
of the protected right. Moreover, because the patent owner has
a monopoly on the use of her invention, there is no need to prove
that the information has been taken from the patent owner.
Because both self-discovery and reverse engineering are
ineffective, it is sufficient for the patent owner to prove that the
defendant is using the invention that is the subject of the patent
without permission. Nevertheless, when a defendant in an
infringement suit challenges the validity of the patent, or argues
that her actions did not breach the patent but rather
“circumvented” it, the patent owner bears the cost refuting these
arguments. Although the burden of proof with respect to these
arguments is on the defendant,6 the patent owner cannot risk
having these arguments accepted, and therefore must refute
them. Consequently, overall costs of litigation in an action for
patent infringement are likely to exceed the costs of litigation
with respect to trade secrets.
In the case of information protected by means of a trade
secret, the initial costs of litigation in an action for
misappropriation should be higher than those in an action for
patent infringement. In an action for misappropriation of a
trade secret, one must prove, among other things, that: (a) the
information meets all the requirement in the definition of a
“trade secret,” including the plaintiff having taken reasonable
security measures;7 (b) the plaintiff is the owner of the trade
patent from the outset (indirect attack). See id. § 282(b).
6. Because the patent serves as prima facie evidence of its validity, the
burden of proof that the invention is not suitable to be registered is imposed
on the breaching defendant. See id. § 282(a). “The burden of establishing
invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such
invalidity.” Id.
7. Miguel Deutch, The Property Concept of Trade Secrets in AngloAmerican Law: An Ongoing Debate, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 313, 340-41 (1997).
Professor Deutch explains that, unlike claims for breach of patent, in which
the patent registry clearly identifies the boundaries of the protected
information, there is no similar level of certainty with respect to the right to a
trade secret, because the creation of the right to a trade secret lacks a formal
foundation. Id. at 341 & n.109. See also Bone, supra note 4, at 278-79, 281;
Hill, supra note 2, at 3. The necessary components for recognition of a trade
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secret or at least has an exclusive license to it;8 and (c) the
defendant committed the tort of trade secret misappropriation.9
Furthermore, in an action for trade secret misappropriation,
there are likely to be additional costs because of the need to
refute the defense arguments, such as (a) that the defendant
discovered the trade secret independently or as a result of
reverse engineering;10 (b) that the use of the secret is protected
secret are: (a) secrecy; (b) the information cannot be easily revealed legally; (c)
the secret information provides an economic advantage; and (d) reasonable
security measures were taken to protect the secret information. See UNIFORM
TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1979) [hereinafter UTSA]. The UTSA was a great
success, as it was enacted by 47 states. See Trade Secrets Act, THE NAT’L CONF.
OF
COMMISSIONERS
ON
UNIFORM
STATE
LAWS,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act
(last
visited May 19, 2015). But the requirement to take security measures as an
independent condition was not required according to the definition in the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
8. Unlike a patent, whose owner is registered in the patent registry, there
is no certainty with respect to the identity of the owner of a trade secret. See
Bone, supra note 4, at 278-79, 281; Hill, supra note 2, at 3. In accordance with
US law, the owner of an exclusive license can institute an action for
misappropriation of a trade secret within the purview of the license, but
afterwards is required to join the licensor. JERRY COHEN & ALAN S. GUTTERMAN,
TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION AND EXPLOITATION 278 (1998).
9. Unlike an action for breach of patent, with respect to the
misappropriation of a trade secret it is necessary to prove that the defendant
took the secret from the plaintiff through the tort of misappropriation of a trade
secret. See Bone, supra, note 4, at 278-79; Deutch, supra note 7; Hill, supra
note 2, at 3.
10. See Bone, supra note 4, at 278-79. Independent discovery and reverse
engineering are permitted actions pursuant to the trade secrets law. Deutch,
supra note 7, at 353-58. “Proper means include: 1. Discovery by independent
invention; 2. Discovery by reverse engineering.” UTSA § 1 cmt. Reverse
engineering is defined in the Comment to UTSA § 1 as follows: “Discovery by
reverse engineering, that is, by starting with the known product and working
backward to find the method by which it was developed.” Id. See also Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (“A trade secret law, however,
does not offer protection against discovery by fair and honest means, such as
by independent invention. . . or by so-called reverse engineering.”); E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015-16 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971); Bone, supra note 2, at 102, 107; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995) (“Independent discovery and
analysis of publicly available products or information are not improper means
of acquisition.”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939); Thomas F.
Cotter, Conflicting Interests in Trade Secrets, 48 FLA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1996);
Hill, supra note 2, at 2-3 (“Two proper means of acquiring a trade secret are
independent discovery and reverse engineering. Reverse engineering is the
process of learning a trade secret by inspecting the product and figuring out
how it works.”); Peterson, supra note 2, at 450-56.
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under the defense of general professional skills or public policy,11
or (c) that the defendant acquired the trade secret in good faith
and for consideration.12
Because actions for trade secrets misappropriation are
complex and require lengthy litigation, some companies exploit
the legal process to prevent former employees from working for
a competitor or opening a competing company. Such baseless
actions create unnecessary litigation costs, frustrate efficient
competition, and inhibit the mobility of employees, all of which
affect the flow of information and economic development.13 A
way of stretching out the litigation is to argue that the former
employee knew many trade secrets, whereas, in reality, she was
exposed only to some of them. Even in cases in which the actions
are not completely without merit, the duration of the litigation
means that were the court to decide not to limit the occupation
of the employee or to shorten the time of the limitation, the
decision is usually irrelevant by the time it is rendered because
the employee has already found other employment or the
potential employer has found another employee. In such cases,
the former employer, who lost the action to limit the former
employee’s occupation, has accomplished what he wanted.
11. In accordance with the exception of the general professional skills, an
employee is not liable for the misappropriation of a trade secret if the
information that is the subject of the right to a trade secret has become part of
his general professional skills. See AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199,
1205 (7th Cir. 1987); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont’l Aviation & Eng’g Corp.,
255 F. Supp. 645, 652-53 (E.D. Mich. 1966); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 42 cmt. d (1995); Bone, supra note 2, at 113. The public policy
exception enables the court to exempt defendants from liability in cases of
trade secret misappropriation if the use of the secret is justified for reasons of
public policy. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c
(1995).
12. Even if a person acquired the stolen trade secret in good faith and for
consideration, he is still liable to the owner of the secret, but the circumstances
of the acquisition give the court discretion to exempt the defendant from
remedies in various amounts. For example, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 44(2)(d) (1995) imposes liability on the purchaser in
good faith and for consideration as well, but permits taking the circumstances
into consideration with respect to the remedies. For an expanded treatment,
see Deutch, supra note 7, at 345-51, 368-69.
13. Bone, supra note 4, at 279; Kitch, Law and Economics, supra note 4,
at 698-99. With respect to the societal interest in encouraging the mobility of
employees, which contributes to the mobility of information that helps develops
the economy, see Hyde, supra note 4, at 1-4, 20, 28-30, 32, 34-36, 60.
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The possibility of exploiting the need to prove many
components in an action for a trade secret misappropriation is
also likely to play into the hands of the defendant, who can
initiate futile proceedings. For example, a former employee can
argue that the information that is alleged to be the trade secret
of the company was not in its possession when he was employed
there, or that it is information that was discovered by him or by
others after he left the company. Such an allegation is made on
the assumption that the company will have difficulty proving
how long it has possessed the information at issue.14
Alternatively, the employee can argue that even if the
information was in the possession of the company at the time he
was employed there, there is no proof that he was indeed
exposed to the relevant information or that he had access to it.
A decision on such matters is likely to stretch out the litigation
and, as a result, to increase its cost.
III. Patents’ and Trade Secrets’ Transaction Costs
Many people possess the skills required to create new
information but lack the ability and the resources to turn the
information into a finished product. In other words, the creator
of the information, for various reasons, is often unable to
maximize the value of the information he has created.
Therefore, both the creator of the information and society have
an interest in transferring the information from the creator to
someone who can turn it into a product.15 A typical case is one
in which a person created information that brought about an
improvement in equipment produced by a certain company.16 In
most cases, the creator of the information cannot independently
14. With respect to this problem, see the website of EscrowTech
International Inc., which provides escrow "IP audit trail services." IP Audit
Trail
Services,
ESCROWTECH
INT’L
INC.,
www.escrowtech.com/ip_audit_trail.php (last visited Jan. 1, 2015). For the
difficulty caused in the absence of a formal dimension for the scope of protected
information, see Deutch, supra note 7, at 341.
15. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614-15 (Universities-National Bureau ed., 1962);
POSNER, supra note 1, at 15-20, 22-23, 53-55.
16. Kitch, The Nature and Function, supra note 4, at 277-78.
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make use of the information in her possession. It would be
inefficient for her to establish a factory to produce that
instrument merely in order to implement the improvement she
devised, and she often does not have the means to do so. The
entity that can maximize the value of the information is the
company that is already producing the equipment. The public
and the creator of the information have an interest in having the
information transferred to the company that can use it in the
most efficient manner.17
The question is: what is the most efficient mechanism for
transferring the information from its creator to the company?
When comparing the patent option to that of trade secrets, it
becomes apparent that the patent option deals well with most of
the risks in a transaction involving information. With a patent,
there is no problem in presenting the invention in the course of
negotiations to a potential purchaser or licensee. The patent
creates a defined set of legal rights that is known to both parties
at the outset of the negotiations. Patents are disclosed in the
patent registry and grant their owners the exclusive right to use
them. Therefore, there are no difficulties in presenting the
invention in the course of negotiations for the sale of the patent
or the granting of a license. Even if the negotiations fail, the
company to which the offer was made cannot make use of the
patent-protected invention. Following the sale of the patent and
its transfer to the purchaser at the patent registry, there is no
concern that the previous owner of the patent will “sell” it again,
because according to the patent registry, she is no longer the
owner of the patent. Nor is there concern that after a patent
owner gave an exclusive license to use the patent, which was
registered in the patent registry, she will grant additional
licenses. The potential licensee can check in the patent registry
and ascertain that an exclusive license has already been
granted. Moreover, there is no fear that the licensee would
falsely represent herself as the owner of the patent or try to “sell”
it, because her rights are disclosed in the patent registry. The
registration in the patent registry leaves no doubt as to who the
owner of the patent is and who the exclusive licensee is. A
registered patent also enables the efficient creation of

17. See Arrow, supra note 15.
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partnerships in the information protected by the patent, when
the patent owner is interested in entering into contracts with
companies that possess complementary information or
resources.18 The patent owner may sell an unspecified portion
of the patent to his new partners, and they will also be registered
in the patent registry.19 These advantages, together with some
others, have led to the development of a phenomenon known as
“patent commercialization.”
Conversely, when we examine the ability to carry out
transactions of transfers, licensing of, or partnership in trade
secrets, the costs of the transaction are significantly higher than
the costs of a similar transaction in patents. When the owner of
a trade secret wishes to present it for the purpose of selling it or
granting a license for its use, she encounters difficulties in
exposing the secret in the course of the negotiations. On the one
hand, the owner cannot agree to present the secret until the
offeree obligates himself by means of a non-disclosure agreement
(NDA) not to use the secret and not to pass it on to a third party
if the negotiations fail. If the secret is disclosed to a potential
buyer in the absence of such a commitment, the latter can
erroneously believe that he may use the secret even without the
consent of the owner. The buyer can then offer a low purchase
price, or else not make any offer to purchase the information,
and use the information as he sees fit. On the other hand, there
may be a case when the potential buyer agrees to sign the nondisclosure agreement, but finds out that the information is
already known to him, which now he will have to prove. This
problem is known as Arrow’s disclosure paradox. This situation
frequently occurs when a person develops an improvement of an
existing product and tries to sell the idea to a company that
manufactures the product. Given that the idea is intended to
improve its product, the company will be concerned that it may
have already arrived at the idea by itself. If it makes a
commitment not to use the information revealed to it in the
course of the negotiations, it will have to prove that the
18. See Kitch, The Nature and Function, supra note 4, at 277-78, 290
(arguing that the patent method decreases transaction costs for the creator of
the information who is interested in transacting with other companies that
have complementary information or resources).
19. For the authority of each partner, see 35 U.S.C. § 262.
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information was indeed in its possession before entering into
negotiations.
There is also a concern that if the negotiations do not
succeed because of the high consideration requested by the
offeror, and the information offered to the company is not known
to it, the company will not be able to use the information in the
future, even if it is able to arrive at the information on its own
at a lower cost, through self-discovery or reverse engineering.
These concerns may lead the company to refuse to sign an
NDA.20 When the offeree is in possession of the information
before the start of the negotiations, substantive law enables him
to continue to use the information. The burden of proof with
respect to this allegation, however, may be imposed on the
offeree. Shifting the burden of proof is not a negligible detail;
the burden of proving that the defendant lawfully acquired the
information is not easily met and involves high litigation costs.21
Under certain circumstances, the burden on the offeree to prove
that the information was already in his possession before the
negotiations may increase the reluctance of the offeree
companies to sign an NDA, especially if there is a risk that their
position will not be accepted.
Moreover, companies that engage in negotiations with
creators of information take the risk of being sued for stealing a
trade secret from an outside entity, which can lead to high
litigation costs and harm the company’s reputation.22 Indeed, as
was demonstrated in an important study, the concern shown by
companies is so great that they not only refuse to sign NDAs but
often refuse entirely to enter into negotiations to acquire a trade
secret or do so infrequently. When companies are prepared to
enter into negotiations despite these concerns, they demand that
the owner of the trade secret sign a waiver before he discloses
the secret information. Generally, by signing such a form, the
20. Arrow, supra note 15, at 614-16; Bone, supra note 4, at 280 n.174;
Steven N. S. Cheung, Property Rights in Trade Secrets, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 40,
44-45 (1982); see also Bone, supra note 2, at 127; Kitch, The Nature and
Function, supra note 4, at 277-78.
21. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v. Holder Found. Seeds, 35 F.3d 1226, 1240
(8th Cir. 1994); Sokol Crystal Prods. v. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 15 F.3d 1427,
1432 (7th Cir. 1994); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 cmt.
b (1995); Bone, supra note 4, at 279 nn.169, 170.
22. Cheung, supra note 20, at 46.
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offeror admits that there are no confidential relations between
himself and the offeree, and that he can rely for protection of his
rights only on rights created pursuant to patent or copyright
law.23 Other companies demand that before the negotiations the
offeror consents to provide the information for a very small sum
of money.24 The attitude is different when the offeror already
has a patent on the information offered.25
There is another risk that concerns offeree companies, even
when they agree to sign a confidentiality agreement (e.g., in
cases in which there is no concern that the information to be
presented to them was previously known to them). The
additional risk stems from the fact that the commitment does
not detail the information that is to be disclosed in the course of
the negotiations.26 In the absence of such detail, there is a risk
that, after a period of time, the offeror may assert that he had
revealed additional information to the offeree company in the
course of the negotiations (which, in actual fact, never
happened), thus preventing the company from making use of it.27
A further risk is present for the owner of the trade secret, even
if the company is prepared to sign a confidentiality agreement

23. Id. at 45; Kitch, The Nature and Function, supra note 4, at 277-78.
For an expanded discussion of this topic and examples of typical release forms,
see ARTHUR H. SEIDEL & RONALD L. PANITCH, WHAT THE GENERAL
PRACTITIONER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT TRADE SECRETS AND EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENTS (1973), as quoted in Cheung, supra note 20. The above
conclusions were reached based on a study of 105 contracts for the
transmission of an idea. Eighty seven of these contracts conditioned the receipt
and/or the examination of the idea on its not forcing relations of
“confidentiality.” Seventy five of the contracts were conditioned on the offeror
waiving all rights to the idea other than those acquired by a present or future
patent. Fifty seven contracts stipulated that the examination of the idea would
not force any commitment of any kind on the accepting company. In practice,
every one of the 105 contracts contained one or more of these stipulations. Del
I. Hawkins & Gerald G. Udell, Corporate Caution and Unsolicited New Product
Ideas: A Survey of Corporate Waiver Requirements, 58 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 375,
381-82 (1976). These findings were for the most part consistent with Cheung’s
findings in a study that included 320 contracts for the transmission of an idea.
Cheung, supra note 20, at 46 n.20.
24. Kitch, The Nature and Function, supra note 4, at 277-78.
25. Cheung, supra note 20, at 45.
26. Detailing the secret as part of the commitment could result in the
offeree reading the commitment, becoming informed of the secret, then
refusing to sign.
27. See IP Audit Trail Services, supra note 14.
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regarding the information that is to be disclosed in the course of
the negotiations. The owner has no proof that he is in fact the
owner of the confidential information disclosed during the
negotiations. In the absence of such proof, the company can
argue that the information disclosed to it did not belong to the
offeror, but rather to another entity.28
The risks to the parties that arise during negotiations for
the sale of a trade secret result in the failure of efficient
transactions at the initial stages. This result is particularly
harmful when the owner of the information cannot make
efficient use of the information he created unless he contracts
with a company operating in that field.29 Efficiency is achieved
when the information is to be used by an entity that appraises it
at its highest value. The highest economic value of the
information is the highest amount that someone is prepared to
pay for it. One is prepared to pay the highest price for the
information if he thinks that he can derive the highest benefit
from it, measured by the price that consumers are willing to pay
for the product based on the information. Therefore, if the
information is in the hands of someone willing and able to pay
the highest amount for it, it will be possible to arrive at an
efficient result.30 In the absence of a solution that can decrease
the risks leading to the failure of efficient transactions in which
the owner of the information transfers it to an entity that can
derive the maximum benefit from it, the result is market
malfunction, caused by, among others, an information failure.31
Resources flow to profitable opportunities unless obstacles
prevent their free flow. One of the obstacles can be the high cost
of information.32 These information costs, which are part of the
transaction costs, cause negotiations to fail before they even
begin, and potentially efficient transactions do not take place.33
If there is a resource that remains unused because of the
inability of the owner to maximize its value, and who prevents

28. Id.
29. See Arrow, supra note 15, at 615.
30. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 12-14, 18-19. For a definition of efficiency
according to the Kaldor-Hicks theory or maximizing wealth, see id. at 17-18.
31. Arrow, supra note 15, at 615-16.
32. POSNER, supra note 1, at 15.
33. Bone, supra note 2, at 127.
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others from making profitable use of it by not transferring the
information to them, an opportunity cost is created. An
opportunity cost is the best price that others can command for
that resource.34 Using collaterals to reduce the risks detailed
above would also increase transaction costs.35
Additional stumbling blocks to carrying out transactions
with respect to trade secrets stem from the absence of public
knowledge regarding the identity of the owners of trade secrets.
The nature of the information that is the subject of the trade
secret is an asset that remains known to the seller even after the
transfer of ownership, creates the risk that the former owner of
the trade secret and his employees may continue to use the trade
secret, including disclosing it to third parties.36 Similarly, there
is a potential for future deceptive transactions in which the
previous owner may continue “to sell” the information to
additional entities after having already sold the secret (so that
at the time of the additional sale, he is no longer the owner).37
The previous owner can easily defraud the offeree because of the
secrecy surrounding the identity of the present owner of the
trade secret. This potential for deceit creates many risks for the
real owner of the secret. The imposition of responsibility on the
third party – the last purchaser – for the use of a trade secret is
complex and results in high investigation and litigation costs.
Moreover, there is the risk of creating a chain of disclosures that
can place the information in the public domain, so that the right
to it expires altogether.38 Even if it is possible to inform
34. For the concept of opportunity costs, see POSNER, supra note 1, at 6-9.
35. The costs caused by the need to use collateral increase transaction
costs. See Bone, supra note 4, at 280.
36. 1 R.M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.02(1)(2) pp. 2-43 – 244.5 (2013). Regarding the possibility that the transferee can obtain an
injunction that would prohibit a former employee of the transferor from using
a trade secret that has been sold, see Hecht Foods v. Sherman, 351 N.Y.S.2d
711 (App. Div. 1974). Regarding the duties of the seller and his employees and
his agents after the sale not to continue to use the secret or to disclose it to
others, see Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp. v. United States, 591 F.2d 652 (Ct.
Cl. 1979); Tode v. Gross, 28 N.E. 469 (N.Y. 1891). Similarly, an inventor who
has transferred an invention that is not yet patented will be stopped from
requesting a patent with the objective of infringing upon the rights of the
transferee. New Era Elec. Range Co. v. Serrell, 169 N.E. 105 (N.Y. 1929).
37. Stewart v. Hook, 45 S.E. 369 (Ga. 1903); MILGRIM, supra note 36;
Cheung, supra note 20, at 44-45.
38. Cheung, supra note 20, at 44-45; Bone, supra note 4, at 280, n.175.
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subsequent purchasers of the rights of previous purchasers,
subsequent purchasers are not required to pay damages for the
period of use of the trade secret until they knew, or should have
known, that prior rights existed.39 Moreover, if the later
purchasers acquired the trade secret in good faith and for
monetary consideration, they will indeed be liable to the
previous purchasers. The circumstances of the purchase,
however, grant discretion to the court to exempt them from
compensation in various amounts.40
The risk of deceit applies not only to future transactions, but
to past ones as well. When it transpires that there were
purchasers prior to the present ones, the present purchasers will
be prevented from using the secret once they know or should
have known about the right of the earlier owners.41 Even if the
purchase of the trade secret was in good faith and for
consideration, the present purchasers are still liable vis-à-vis
the earlier ones, although, here too, the circumstances of the
39. The law in the US imposes liability on a third party not only in cases
in which he knew that he was using a stolen trade secret but also in cases in
which he should have known. Regarding the extent of the protection in the US,
see UTSA § 1(2)(i), (ii)(B)(I), (III); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 40(b)(3); H.H. PERRITT, TRADE SECRETS: A PRACTITIONER’S
GUIDE 111 n.14 (1994); Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods Ltd., 941 F.2d 970,
972-73 (9th Cir. 1991); Wright v. Palmer, 464 P.2d 363, 366 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1970); Deutch, supra note 7, at 344, 353, 360. According to English and
Australian law, the protection with respect to third parties is based on the laws
of fiduciary duty. A third party that has received a secret when he knew or
should have known of the breach of trust, will be considered to be liable himself
vis-à-vis the owner of the secret. Even in cases in which the third party did not
know and there was no reason he should have known of the breach of trust at
the time of receipt of the trade secret, he is subject to the droit de suite of the
owner, if he did not change his situation to his detriment while still acting in
good faith. A third party who did not know and was not expected to know at
the time of receipt of the trade secret about the breach, and changed his
situation to his detriment as a result, is liable to the owner of the information
as a matter of discretion, according to the circumstances, including the extent
of the losses caused to each party and other justified considerations. Therefore,
the absolute fact that the defendant is a purchaser in good faith is not
necessarily sufficient to exempt him from liability. See Deutch, supra note 7,
at 351. In this regard, see also Ansell Rubber Co. Pty., Ltd. v. Allied Rubber
Industries Pty., Ltd. [1967] V.R. 37; Schering Chem. Ltd. v. Falkman, Ltd. 2
W.L.R. 848 (1981); A. COLEMAN, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS 49
(1992); ROBERT DEAN, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 258-72 (1990).
40. See supra note 12. Regarding English and Australian law, see also
supra note 39.
41. See supra note 39.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1

14

2014

TRADE SECRETS REGISTRY

469

purchase grant discretion to the court to exempt the present
purchasers from remedies in various amounts.42
Fraudulent transactions create litigation costs, and the risk
of fraud and uncertainty creates additional transaction costs.
For example, potential purchasers may ask the seller for
collateral to ensure that the trade secret rights received were not
already sold to a previous purchaser, in the event that it may be
possible for the seller or his employees to make use of the trade
secret after the sale, or in case the seller resells the trade secret
to future purchasers after the sale.43
The difficulty in conducting trade secret transactions is
present also with respect to the granting of a license to use the
trade secret. In the absence of public notice regarding the
existence of an exclusive license for the use of a trade secret, and
regarding the identity of the owner of the exclusive license, the
trade secret owner can grant additional licenses that will breach
the right to the exclusive license. Given the existing law, if the
recipients of the additional licenses receive the secret with the
consent of its owner, the owner of the exclusive license has the
right to sue only the owner of the secret on grounds of breach of
contract.44
Another risk to which the trade secret owner is exposed is
that the licensee may reveal the secret to third parties. As
already noted, this leads to high investigation and litigation
42. See supra note 12. Regarding English and Australian law, see also
supra note 39.
43. Regarding the need to demand collateral in the case of an offer to
acquire a trade secret, owing to the concern that the seller is not the owner of
the trade secret, see Deutch, supra note 7, at 364. Failure to receive collateral
transfers the risk to the purchaser. Id.
44. UTSA § 1(2) (ii) (B) (II) includes in the definition of “misappropriation”
of a trade secret, “disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express
or implied consent by a person who. . . (B) at the time of disclosure or use knew
or had reason to know that his knowledge of the trade secret was. . . (II)
acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or
limit its use. . . .” But the use of a trade secret by the other owners of the
licenses is not considered to be contrary to the consent of the owner of the trade
secret and is not in contravention of their duty to the owner of the secret,
therefore they have not committed the tort of misappropriation of a trade
secret. The owner of the additional license uses the secret in accordance with
his contract with the owner of the secret, and has no duty not to use the secret
with respect to the owner of the exclusive license, of whose existence he is not
even aware.
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costs intended to impose liability on the latter. In any case the
third party will be exempt from liability for the use of the trade
secrets up to the point at which he knows or should have known
that the secrets were stolen from their owners. A more serious
risk is disclosure of the secret by a licensee in order to bring
about the expiration of the right.45 Moreover, in the absence of
public notice regarding the identity of the exclusive licensee, the
licensee is likely to represent himself as the owner of the secret
and to sell the right to third parties who buy it in good faith and
for consideration. The purchasers will naturally be liable to the
owner of the secret, but the circumstances of the purchase grant
discretion to the court to exempt the purchasers from remedies
to various degrees.46 These risks lead the owner of the trade
secret to demand collateral from the owner of the license to
insure the confidentiality of the information, which in turn
increases transaction costs.47
IV. Financing Costs: Patents and Trade Secrets as Guarantees
for an Investment
The patent system is efficient in sales and licensing
transactions and in the creation of partnerships, and it enables
the creation of mortgaging transactions. An integral part of the
process of the development of information is the receipt of
outside funding from investors who believe in the economic
value of the information being developed.48 To receive financing,
the creator of the information must disclose the developed
information to investors, with the level of detail depending on
their demands. If the investors are persuaded by the economic
potential of the idea, they will be willing to invest on the

45.

45. Perritt, supra note 39, at 110-11 n.114; Cheung supra note 20, at 44-

46. See supra note 12. Regarding English and Australian law, see also
supra note 39.
47. Cheung, supra note 20, at 44-45; Bone, supra note 4, at 280 n.175. As
part of the study he conducted of 150 contracts for licenses for the use of
information, Cheung indeed found that the demand for collateral characterizes
contracts for the granting of a license to a trade secret. Id.
48. Kitch, The Nature and Function, supra note 4, at 277-78; Raymond T.
Nimmer & Patricia A. Krauthaus, Secured Financing and Information
Property Rights, 2 HIGH TECH. L. J. 195, 197 (1987).
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condition that they receive the appropriate collateral. If the
collateral is an asset that is not connected to the developed
information, such as real estate, there is no difficulty in securing
the financing. But if the developers of the information have no
assets other than the rights to that information, the only way to
provide collateral to investors is to mortgage the rights to the
information. The amorphous character of the rights to the
information can create many difficulties when offering it as an
asset for purposes of collateral, because of the inherent risks
described below, thus justifying the exercise of a great deal of
caution in accepting such collateral. A mechanism is needed,
therefore, to lower the risks of using the rights to the
information as collateral and to keep the transaction costs down,
thereby avoiding an increase in the interest rate charged for the
loan.49
Both the lender and the borrower have the incentive to
create collateral out of the rights to information. After
decreasing the risk level, the receipt of collateral in the form of
rights to the information can be of great value to the lender. 50
The ability to offer the right to the information as collateral is
even more important to the borrower. Naturally, the creator of
the information also has the option to sell an unspecified part of
the ownership rights of the information against receipt of
financing. This is the most common option at present, but it is
not a desirable alternative for the borrower. In most cases, after
the sale of an unspecified portion of the ownership rights for the
purposes of financing, the creator of the information remains the
owner of a small, unspecified portion of the idea that she created,
usually as the owner of a relatively small percentage of the
overall shares in the company that is to develop the idea. This
result is unnecessary. If the creator of the information believes
in the potential of the idea she created, she will prefer to receive
a loan, put up the information as collateral, and return the
amount borrowed, instead of selling an non-specific substantial
portion of the right of ownership, the future value of which is
likely to be exponentially higher than the amount she will have
received for it in order to secure the financing.
49. Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 48, at 195.
50. Robert S. Bramson, Intellectual Property as Collateral – Patents,
Trade Secrets, Trademarks and Copyrights, 36 BUS. LAW 1567, 1598 (1981).
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When examining which of the two mechanisms for the
protection of an invention – patent or trade secret – is more
appropriate for purposes of commercial financing, there is no
doubt that patent law is preferable. It is straightforward to
mortgage patent by registering the mortgage in the patent
registry.51 The possibility of registering a mortgage on a patent
solves many of the problems involved in the mortgaging of
information. The creator of the information has no difficulty
presenting the patent-protected information to the financier for
the purpose of evaluating the information as an asset
appropriate to serve as collateral. The obligation of the financier
not to use the information is completely unnecessary. The
information protected by a patent is already disclosed to the
public in the patent registry, and the owner of the patent has the
exclusive right to use the invention. To the extent that the
financier reaches the conclusion that the patent is appropriate
to serve as collateral, he can accept it as such. The mortgaged
asset is the registered patent, and therefore the financier has no
difficulty proving the scope of the mortgaged information. If the
owner of the patent has many patents and is interested in
mortgaging only a particular one, there is no difficulty in
creating a mortgage only for that patent, leaving the remaining
patents unencumbered.
The mortgage continues to be
registered as a property right even if the ownership rights to the
patent are transferred to a new owner.
The patent system also assists in protecting the value of the
collateral, which is determined by several multi-factored
parameters: the existence of the mortgaged asset, the borrower’s
proof of ownership of the asset, and the absence of a breach of
third parties’ rights. When the collateral is a patent, the
financier can find proof in the patent registry that the invention
has been registered as a patent and that the borrower is the
registered owner, and he (the lender) can rely on this

51. If there it is desired that the mortgage on the patent be valid with
respect to third parties, it must be registered both in the patent registry and
in the registry where mortgages are registered. U.C.C. art. 9. See David
Einhorn, U.S.A. Report Q190: Contracts Regarding Intellectual Property
Rights (Assignments and Licenses) and Third Parties, at 7-8, available at
https://www.aippi.org/download/commitees/190/GR190usa.pdf (last visited
May 19, 2015).
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registration.52 A cautious financier, however, should not make
do with the patent registration and the registration of the
borrower as the owner of the patent. Rather, he should check
whether the invention was qualified to be registered as a patent
and whether the borrower was indeed entitled to be registered
as the owner of the patent. Otherwise, there is a risk that the
patent will be nullified. It is also necessary to examine whether
the invention breaches any third party preferred rights, because
it is possible that the patent infringes on a previous patent.53
The second parameter is the ability of the owner of the
mortgaged asset to protect his property: if the mortgaging of a
patent is at issue, the ability of the patent owner to protect its
value is particularly high because the registered patent creates
an exclusive right to the use of the patented invention. The
third, and the final parameter, is ability of the owner of the
guarantee to realize the collateral.
As noted above, a substantive part of any development
52. The patent registry is a registry of rights, in other words, before the
registration of the patent an examination is carried out by the registrar of
patents concerning the validity of the patent and the identity of its owners.
The registry encourages the registration of transfers of ownership through 35
U.S.C. § 261 [hereinafter section 261], which provides that the transfer of a
patent is void vis-à-vis any purchaser or mortgagee who acted in good faith and
for consideration, unless the transfer was registered in the patent registry
within three months from the date of the transfer, or before the date of the last
acquisition or mortgage. See Einhorn, supra note 51, at 2. Therefore, it is
possible to check easily, quickly, and at minimal expense that a patent exists
for the invention in the patent registry, and to check the identity of the
currently registered owner of the patent. Bramson, supra note 50, at 1574-75.
53. With respect to the existing risk of voiding a patent, see supra note 5
and accompanying text. See also Bramson, supra note 50, at 1575-1577, n.38.
The existence of a patent in the name of the borrower does not preclude the
possibility that a previous patent exists, which was breached by the borrower’s
patent. This occurs in situations in which the rule known as “blocking patent”
is applicable. According to this rule, a person who made a significant
improvement in a patented invention can receive a patent on the improvement
(although the latter must still receive a license from the owner of the previous
patent to use the improvement). The result is that neither the owner of the
original patent nor the one who improved upon it can use the improvement
unless they arrive at an agreement. But the “reverse doctrine of equivalents,”
which is used only infrequently, releases the one improving upon the patent
from liability for breach of patent if the improvement contains radical progress.
Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1007-13 (1997). See also Bone, supra note 2, at 104, n.19.
For practical suggestions regarding preliminary examinations for the
prevention of such concerns, see Bramson, supra note 50.
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process involves securing outside funding from investors who
believe in the potential value of the information being developed.
To receive financing, the creator of the information must
persuade the potential investors of the quality of the developed
information, revealing as much detail as required by the
investor. Some investors are satisfied with the presentation of
a more general idea. But there are those who insist on
examining the detailed information before deciding whether to
invest in developing the information. They also want to make
sure that there is a formula, as promised, behind the general
definition, and that the confidential information meets the
criteria of a trade secret. The disclosure of a secret to investors
creates the same problem that arises when disclosing a secret in
the initial stages of negotiations for its transfer. The owner of
the trade secret who wishes to present the secret to a
professional financier also faces the problem that the financier
refuses to sign a confidentiality agreement before the secret is
disclosed to him. Professional financiers, especially those who
deal with the financing of high-tech companies, are regularly
exposed to financing requests from entities possessing
confidential information, at times competing companies that
deal in the development of information in the same field. The
advance signing of multiple confidentiality agreements exposes
the financiers to substantial litigation and limits their ability to
invest in broad market segments. At the same time, the owner
of the secret may hesitate to disclose the secret lest the financier
mistakenly think that he can take the secret and disclose it to
another company in which he is interested in investing.54
The exposure of the secret is not the only problem when
accepting a trade secret as collateral for a loan. In the absence
of proof of what the mortgaged trade secret is, and should the
loan go unpaid, the professional financier may be left with the
borrowing company, while the employees and founders will have
disappeared with the trade secrets. Moreover, the company’s
founders and employees may argue that the trade secrets in
their possession were developed after they left the company, and

54. See Lyne Sharpe Paine, Trade Secrets and the Justification of
Intellectual Property: A Commentary on Hettinger, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 247,
256 (1991).
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that, therefore, the collateral is not applicable to them.55 In
practice, this concern can be resolved if the owner of the trade
secret agreed to deposit the secret with the professional
financier. The owner, however, is likely to refuse because the
financier might not take the necessary security measures and
his right will therefore expire. Moreover, even if the trade secret
owner were to be willing to leave a copy of the original trade
secret in the possession of the financier, this would not
constitute a solution for cases in which the financiers want the
collateral to apply to the trade secret that is subject to ongoing
development. In these cases, it is not reasonable to expect the
owner of the trade secret to deposit with the investors, on an ongoing basis, the latest development of the trade secret.
Another problem exists if the owner has more than one
trade secret. In this case, it is difficult to distinguish between
the owner’s various trade secrets if he is interested in
mortgaging only one of them. If the mortgage agreement
between the owner of the secrets and the financier includes only
general definitions, it will be difficult later to distinguish
between the various secrets that may exist in a similar field.
Moreover, to enable the mortgaging of trade secrets, it is also
necessary to create a system that permits the registration of
these mortgages, so that it is possible to warn third parties and
give the financier the status of a secured creditor. The mortgage
registration systems in their present form are not appropriate
for mortgaging trade secrets that cannot, for example, be listed
in the registry of trade secret mortgages, which is open for public
viewing.
Because of the many difficulties involved in the mortgaging
of trade secrets in accordance with existing law, there are few
instances in which companies mortgage trade secrets, despite
the advantages of doing so, as described above.56 Therefore,
55. See IP Audit Trail Services, supra note 14; IP Collateral and
Investment
Protection
Service,
ESCROWTECH
INT’L
INC.,
www.escrowtech.com/ip_protection.php (last visited Jan 30, 2015).
56. See, for example, a relatively rare case that dealt with mortgaging a
trade secret: State Bank of Annawan v. Rendispos Corp., 173 U.S.P.Q. 136
(S.D. Ill. 1971). The State Bank of Annawan received several mortgages on
patents and trade secrets of the Pace Corporation as security for a loan.
Because of several business moves by Rendispos Corporation, using the
protected information of Pace Corporation, the latter were edged out of the

21

476

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:2

accommodations must be made between commercial financing
laws and trade secret laws to appropriately address these
problems and reduce the cost of financing.57
V. Employment Costs: Making Employees Privy to an
Invention Protected by a Patent or to Information Protected as
a Trade Secret
If the owner of confidential information wishes to use it for
the purpose of developing products, he has no alternative but to
share that information with his employees. If the confidential
information is not legally protected, these employees can steal it
from the owner and transfer it to his competitors. Legal
protection of the confidential information is likely to reduce this
risk. In this regard, there is a substantive difference between
patent protection and trade secret protection. The owner of a
factory with a patent registered in his name that gives him a
monopoly on the protected information is not concerned about
revealing the protected information, which in any case is
disclosed to the public in the patent registry, to employees. At
the same time, the trade secret owner must trust his employees
not to transfer the trade secret to his competitors. Having them
sign a commitment not to use or disclose the trade secret is not
always effective. The absence of public disclosure of the identity
of those subject to the right to a trade secret can cause several
difficulties. For example, when an employee is interested in
moving to a new place of employment, the new employer may
not be aware of the fact that the person, whom she is interested
in hiring, is in the possession of trade secrets belonging to his
previous employer. Current trade secrets law does not enable
the owner of the trade secret to seek damages from the
competitor (the new employer) for making use of the owner’s
trade secrets (that the new employer received from the new
employee) until she became aware, or should have become aware

market and declared insolvent. The patents and trade secrets of Pace were
transferred to the bank, which filed an action against Rendispos Corporation
for breach of patent and unauthorized appropriation of trade secrets. The bank
prevailed in the action and received funds that enabled repayment of the loan.
57. See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 48, at 195-200, 204, 224, & 226.
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of the fact that these were stolen trade secrets.58 Moreover, in
the absence of public notice of the former employee being subject
to the right of the trade secret owner, the former employee can
easily sell the trade secret to a buyer in good faith and for
consideration, while representing himself as the owner of the
secret. In such a case, the buyer will be liable to the owner of the
trade secret, but the circumstances of the purchase grant
discretion to the court to exempt him from remedies in various
amounts.59 Such risks can cause concerns for the owner of a
trade secret about revealing them to employees. To avoid such
risk, she may prefer to choose the inefficient alternative of
employing people with whom she has personal or family ties and
on whom she can rely, but who are not necessarily the best
people for the job. The concern about employee involvement can
also cause the trade secret owner to organize his business in an
inefficient manner, e.g., dividing assignments among a large
number of employees so that each of them knows less, or
reducing the research and development division to a small and
inefficient number of employees.60 The fear of involving
additional entities can cause the owner of the secret to sacrifice
efficiency by making do without a part of his work force. The
demand for collateral from employees to ensure their fulfillment
of the confidentiality commitment increases the costs of
employment.
The risk in employing workers affects not only the current
employer, who is concerned that these entities may leak his
trade secrets. It also affects the willingness of other companies
to purchase the business of the previous employer. For example,
company A, which has a large number of confidentiality
agreements with employees regarding trade secrets, now
proposes to merge with company B through a sale, so that
58. See supra note 39.
59. See supra note 12.
60. These phenomena were mentioned in cases in which the law does not
recognize the right to a trade secret or when such a right is not enforced. See
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1974); Bone, supra note
4, at 272-73 n.143; Friedman, Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 67; Sharp
Paine, supra note 54, at 253-56. But these phenomena also occur in cases in
which trade secret laws are enforced, but they are not efficient enough and
many risks remain for the owner of the trade secret, in the absence of a public
record of the identity of those subject to his rights, as stated above.
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company A ceases to exist. Company B is concerned that former
employees of company A, who moved to a new company, can
claim that because company A no longer exists, there is no issue
of possessing trade secrets of their former employer. Company
A, however, had assigned all employee confidentiality
agreements to company B. In these cases, new employers, who
would like to hire former employees of company A, find it
difficult to ascertain whether their potential employees have a
confidentiality obligation toward other companies. They may
consider the use that they can make of the trade secrets, until
such time that they become aware of the stolen rights, as use in
good faith. Company B will then be entitled to damages only
from the point when the new employers became aware or should
have become aware that these were stolen secrets.61 Moreover,
if the new employers purchase the trade secrets in good faith and
for consideration, they are liable to company B, but the
circumstances of the purchase grant discretion to the court to
exempt the new employers from remedies in various amounts.62
This places all the trade secrets of company A at risk, reducing
its value and reducing the willingness of company B to acquire
it.
Creating appropriate assurances to guarantee the
confidentiality agreements of employees of company A results in
higher transaction costs.
These problems require solutions that would reduce
litigation costs when employees transfer to other companies, i.e.,
solutions that shorten legal proceedings and enable the free
movement of employees. Similarly, solutions are needed to
reduce the risks and existing uncertainty in performing rights
transactions. Employers’ confidence in employing workers can
be increased by reducing the risk of misappropriation of secrets,
so that the owner of the right to a trade secret can efficiently
maximize its value. The number of existing risks in carrying out
trade secret transactions, compared with similar patent
transactions, is likely to reduce greatly the number of
transactions in rights to trade secrets by way of sale, licensing,
mortgaging, and creation of partnerships. These assumptions

61. See supra note 39.
62. See supra note 12. Regarding English and Australian law, see also
supra note 39.
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were borne out by studies that examined their accuracy.63 Based
on an appraisal of the efficiency of the market of trade secret
transactions compared with the efficiency of the patent system,
it may be presumed that this market is not as developed as it
could be.64 In other words, despite the fact that the number of
rights to information protected by trade secret law is apparently
greater than the number of rights to information protected by
patents, the number of patent transactions greatly exceeds the
number of trade secret transactions. In my opinion, this
situation does not stem from a lack of desire to make trade secret
transactions, but rather from the absence of sufficient legal
certainty in carrying out transactions in this right. The proof of
this presumption lies in the fact that when efforts are made to
create arrangements that reduce the risk of conducting
transactions in rights to trade secrets, as shown in the next part,
many companies express interest in such services.

63. The intent is transactions in a trade secret as an asset in its own right
and not as part of a general sale of companies or businesses. In a study that
examined approximately 150 contracts for licenses for ideas, it transpired that
the ratio between the licenses for trade secrets and the licenses for patents is
one to ten. This finding, however, is subject to a reservation. Unlike the case
of patents, it is not possible to count the number of trade secrets in existence
or the overall number of licenses granted with respect to them. Nevertheless,
this finding is consistent with the estimation of several legal commentators.
See Cheung, supra note 20, at 44-45. Although Cheung views this study as
providing relatively weak evidence owing to the reservation noted above, the
conclusion is supported, in his opinion, by the impression of other legal
commentators cited by him: ARTHUR H. SEIDEL, WHAT THE GENERAL
PRACTITIONER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE (1956); SEIDEL
& PANITCH, supra note 23 . Note that there is a lack of data regarding the
licensing of patents (and, a fortiori, regarding licensing of trade secrets) and
this topic was even suggested for an empirical study. See Mark .A. Lemley,
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 34 (2001). Indeed, in
the course of the “Carnegie Mellon Survey,” the income from the licensing of
patents was examined as a motivation for receiving a patent, and it was
revealed that this was one of the least emphasized reasons, as opposed to
others. Therefore, it was concluded that only a small portion of the existing
and future population of patent holders is of the opinion that they could
conduct transactions in this right. Later it transpired, however, that the
motivation for conducting negotiations, which was seen to be a significant
motivation, also included income from licensing, and therefore these results
are not unequivocal and vary with the type of industry. See Cohen et al., supra,
note 3, at 17-24, Fig. 7-8 & Table 8-9.
64. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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VI. The Escrow Companies and the Indonesian Law
It is a well-established fact that the law lags behind
technological development and does not address the many
difficulties that arise as a result of the fast pace of change. In
the trade secrets context, the lacuna resulting from the absence
of legal solutions has led to the establishment of private
companies that provide services to deal with the certain aspects
of these problems. These companies offer, among others, to
allow customers to deposit their trade secrets with them in trust
(hereinafter “escrow companies”).65 Some allow only physical
deposits, but most of the companies allow deposits through
encrypted communications. The deposits are date-stamped.
The escrow companies provide services to many entities,
including Fortune 500 companies, capital risk funds, financial
institutions, law firms, educational institutions, and
governmental agencies.66 The existence of these companies
attests not only to the need for such services, but also to the fact
that companies availing themselves of these services do not
hesitate to send their secret information through encrypted
communications to the escrow companies.
They are not
concerned about the fact that their secret information will be
held in coded and secure form in one place together with trade
secrets of many other companies, something that would seem to
offer an incentive to hackers of encryption systems and
networks. Experience shows that concerns in this area are not
65. See, e.g., ESCROWTECH, www.escrowtech.com, (last visited Jan. 29,
2015) (founded in 1992); ESCROW EUROPE, www.escroweurope.com (last visited
Jan. 29, 2015) (founded in 1989). An institution in Ecuador operates as a data
bank for traditional knowledge. Communities of native citizens can deposit the
traditional knowledge preserved by them in a secret file (each community has
exclusive access to its file). If the information deposited is considered a trade
secret, the government assists the community in negotiating with various
entities through a material transfer agreement. The profit from the
agreements is divided between the government and the community. Profits of
the community are used to finance special projects for the community. See
STEPHEN A. HANSEN & JUSTIN W. VANFLEET, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 29 (2003).
66. See, e.g., EscrowTech – The Right Choice!, ESCROWTECH INT’L, INC.,
www.escrowtech.com/about_escrowTech.php (last visited Jan. 29, 2015); see
also
Electronic
Deposit
Submissions,
ESCROWTECH INT’L, INC.,
www.escrowtech.com/online_deposits.php; IP Audit Trail Services, supra note
14.
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justified. The escrow companies address some of the problems
we have described, and with their help, it is possible to save
some of the litigation and transaction costs that we pointed out
above. Below is a list of problems that can be overcome by using
escrow services.67
A. The deposit of information to be offered in negotiations in
order to prove that the offeror was the owner of the trade secret
before the negotiations. Such a deposit can also protect the
offeree company because the commitment not to use the
information disclosed in the course of the negotiations pertains
only to the information deposited by the offeror before the
beginning of negotiations. Similarly, the routine deposit of
information by the offeree company can prove that the
information was in its possession before the negotiations. This
proof is important given the existing exception that provides
that the commitment not to use information disclosed during
negotiations does not apply to information known to the offeree
before the beginning of negotiations.
B. Deposit of secret information for the purpose of proving
that the information was in the possession of the company when
the former employee worked there. Such a deposit would avoid
claims by former employees that the information was created
after they had left the company and that the information was
not known to the company when they worked there. The escrow
companies allow businesses to deposit their secret information
without having to distinguish the amount of information known
to each individual employee. When a company does not create
individualized deposits, there is no solution to the litigation
problem of a company falsely arguing that the employee knew
trade secrets to which he was not even exposed. Similarly, there
is no solution to the unsubstantiated claim by an employee that
even if the information was known to the company, there is no
proof that the employee was exposed to it. These problems can
be solved if the company creates individual deposits for each
employee. When such deposits are made in real time, in
encrypted communication, it can be accomplished at a relatively
low cost, as explained below. Such a deposit can currently be

67. IP Audit Trail Services, supra note 14; IP Collateral and Investment
Protection Service, supra note 55.
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accomplished through the services of escrow companies.
Nevertheless, the law must create legal incentives to encourage
companies to update the registration and to discourage overregistration.
C. The deposit of secret information for the purpose of
mortgaging it to a lender. The secret information cannot be
expunged from the deposit, and therefore the lender can rely on
the secret information as collateral. Dating the deposit of the
information precludes an argument by company owners, or by
their employees, that the secret information in their possession
was created only after they had left the company and therefore
the mortgage does not apply to them. Relating the mortgage to
secret information deposited in a particular box with the escrow
company can provide a solution to the problem of separating and
distinguishing between the various trade secrets of the owner of
the secret at issue, if he is interested in mortgaging only one
trade secret.
As far as we know, the services offered by the escrow
company do not address the public registration of the identity of
the owners of trade secret rights. The only official mechanism
of which we are aware that deals with the registration of the
identity of the purchasers and receivers of licenses to trade
secret rights is the law enacted in Indonesia in 2000, which
regulates the trade secret laws in that country. This law created
a unique system according to which the transfer or licensing of
a trade secret must be in writing and documented in the Office
of the Directorate General of Intellectual Property in the
Indonesian Ministry of Justice. After the document is deposited,
a notice of the transfer or licensing is published in special trade
secret gazettes.68 The transfer or licensing of a trade secret that
is not documented as described above has no validity with
respect to third parties.69
The services offered by the escrow companies and the
68. Law on Trade Secret, No. 30, Art. 5 (5), 8(3) (2000) (Indon.).
69. Law on Trade Secret, No. 30, Art. 5-10 (2000) (Indon.). It seems that
it is required to deposit only the transfer or licensing agreement, whereas the
trade secret itself, which is to be held in confidence, cannot be deposited. As
discussed below, this method has many shortcomings, which would not be
resolved even if it were necessary to deposit the secret itself. These
shortcomings can be resolved by the registry for trade secrets proposed in this
study.
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Indonesian legislative mechanism offer solutions for only some
of the problems that we have described. For example, they do
not provide a solution for cases in which a “new employer” did
not know that the potential new employee is subject to a duty of
confidentiality with respect to his former employer or his
proxies. Similarly, these arrangements do not solve the problem
that arises when a former employee proposes to sell the trade
secret of his former employer to a third party, stating that it is
his trade secret. Therefore, companies that negotiate with a
person representing himself as the owner of a trade secret
cannot be certain that the secret is his, even if he previously
deposited it with an escrow company. The possibility of
mortgaging a trade secret through an escrow company is
appropriate for static trade secrets, in which there is no ongoing
development, such as a given formula. In most cases, trade
secrets are dynamic and the lender is interested in the mortgage
applying to the developing trade secret. For this purpose, an
incentive is needed for the owner of the secret to update the
information deposited for the purpose of the mortgage.
The duty included in Indonesian law to document every
transfer or license of trade secret rights in the official state office
and in the gazette of trade secrets for the purpose of validity with
respect to third parties provides only a partial solution. For
example, if C knows that A sold a trade secret to B in the past
(from perusal of the gazette), and now A is offering to sell a trade
secret to C, claiming that it is a different trade secret, C cannot
know whether A is deceiving him, trying to sell him a trade
secret that he has already sold to B (C has no right to see the
trade secret that was sold to B). A similar problem occurs when
C knows that in the past A gave B an exclusive license to use a
trade secret, and now A is offering C a license to use the trade
secret, claiming that it is a different one. C cannot know that A
may be trying to defraud him by proposing a license for the same
trade secret for which B holds an exclusive license. Another
problem occurs if C knows that in the past B received a license
for a trade secret from A, and now B proposes that C purchase
the trade secret, stating that this is a different trade secret. C
cannot know whether B is deceiving him, attempting to sell him
a trade secret to which he merely has an exclusive license. The
Indonesian law is also unable to address cases in which former
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employees offer for sale the secrets of their former employer.
The problem with escrow companies is that they function,
among others, as companies that accept the deposit of trade
secrets in trust, and not as a public registry, the objective of
which is to disclose certain data to the public. The limitation of
their services enables them to provide a solution only to the first
level of problems, and they do not provide an overall solution to
the complete array of problems described above. The difficulty
with the Indonesian law is that trade secrets involved in
transactions are not deposited with an objective entity that can
compare the trade secrets of past transactions with those of new
transactions proposed by parties to the previous transactions.
The absence of a deposit procedure also precludes locating
former employees who are offering for sale, as their own, the
trade secret of the former employer. The inability to compare
trade secrets allows too much room for fraud.
VII. The Proposed Registry for Trade Secrets
In the previous sections, I showed that when it comes to
transaction costs, the option of patenting is preferable to trade
secrecy. The advantage of patents is manifest also with respect
to litigation costs, unless the defendant challenges the validity
of the patent, or if the defendant circumvented the patent by
“designing around” it. The effectiveness of the proposed registry
for trade secrets should be judged, therefore, on its ability to
decrease transaction and litigation costs, as well as the financing
and employment cost, created by trade secrets law in such a way
that its benefits exceed the costs of establishing the registry, of
its operation, and the additional public costs listed below.
When there are deliberations in a given legal system about
how rights to a certain asset should be regulated and about the
means of transferring those rights, it is necessary to consider
two important factors: the means of acquiring the initial
ownership of the asset, and the means for transferring
ownership of the asset and for creating secondary rights with
respect to it.70 Generally, there are three methods of acquiring
70. Robert Nozick is of the opinion that property laws must include only
three rules: a.) A rule detailing what is permissible seizure that confers upon
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rights to assets and of transferring of these rights. According to
the first method, acquisition of the rights is created by
possession, and transfer of the rights is completed with the
transfer of the possession. According to the second method,
acquisition of the rights is created by registration with a registry
that regulates the rights of the asset, and the transfer of the
rights is accomplished strictly by transferring these rights in the
registry. There are substantive disadvantages to both these
methods. In the first method there are high costs incurred
because of the need to protect the possession of the asset as a
way of serving public notice of ownership.71 Furthermore,
possession is weaker than registration in its effectiveness as a
public sign of ownership. Possession does not clarify the
substance of the possessor’s right,72 and it is difficult to split the
right into secondary rights when the public notice is based
exclusively on possession. With the second method, a difficulty
arises with respect to assets that have not yet been registered.
The exclusivity granted by the registry relates only to registered
assets, and only for those can the ownership right or secondary
rights (such as tenancy, mortgage) be realized or transferred to
others. In other words, it is not possible to realize ownership
rights or secondary rights of an asset that is not registered.73
There is a third method, however, that integrates the two
other methods. The first right of ownership is based strictly on
possession, and once that has been proven, the right can be
the one seizing the first right to ownership of a resource with no previous
owners; b.) A rule detailing what constitutes valid, willful transfer of a certain
resource from its lawful owner to its new owner; c.) A rule detailing how the
existing ownership structure needs to be corrected when it transpires that one
of the preceding rules has been violated. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE
AND UTOPIA 150-53, 160 (1974).
71. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 101-04. As an example of assets in which
possession is the source of the foundation of property rights, Professor Posner
cites wild animals, treasures and other examples. Id.; see also Carol M. Rose,
Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985).
72. As opposed to a registry that accurately records the substance of the
registered right such as ownership, tenancy, mortgage, etc. One who possesses
an asset may be the owner, tenant, borrower, bailee, owner of a right to a lien,
retailer in consignment transactions, or thief. The public nature of the
possession does not attest with certainty to the existence of the possessor’s
right, nor does it attest to the content of this right. Possession attests to the
possibility that the possessor has some right to the possessed asset.
73. Posner, supra note 1, at 101-02.
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registered. The transfer of rights and the splitting of the right
into secondary rights is accomplished exclusively within the
framework of the registry. This solves several problems: (a)
creating an ownership right over an asset that has not yet been
registered; (b) reducing the cost of maintaining the public nature
of the right (the cost of the public notice provided through the
registry is necessarily lower than the costs of protecting a
possession); and (c) transferring and splitting the rights, which
can be accomplished with greater efficiency through the registry.
In other words, the registry must be declarative regarding the
creation of the first ownership right, and constitutive with
respect to the performance of transactions regarding the right
and the splitting of the right into secondary rights.74
Another key question focuses on the nature of the potential
asset that is to be regulated by the trade secret registry. Is a
trade secret an appropriate asset for regulation by a registry?
Should the creation of a right of first ownership through
possession or a substitute for possession, and transactions with
respect to it be carried out only through the registry? Professor
Miguel Deutch proposed regarding the obligation to take
security measures in trade secret law, among others, a
requirement for meeting public notice demands. The public
notice inherent in the means of security stems from the fact that,
when a person uses security measures he demonstrates control
over the information. Control is the essence of possession, and
possession is one of the main sources of the characteristic of
public notice. Taking security measures serves notice of the
existence of rights. A person who is confronted with measures
of security, such as a safe or the fence of a factory, generally
knows that control is exercised over the information protected
by the security measures, and that the owner claims the rights
to such information.75 Note that this is not a question of making
74. See Posner, supra note 1, at 101-05. For the importance of the registry
as a means of splitting property rights efficiently, so that concurrent secondary
rights and future rights with respect to the asset can be given, see Douglas
Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty and the Transfer of
Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 303-04 (1984); Richard A. Epstein, Notice and
Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1354-56
(1982).
75. See Deutch, supra, note 7, at 329-32; Don Wiesner & Anita Cava,
Stealing Trade Secrets Ethically, 47 MD. L. REV. 1076, 1114-15 (1988).
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the information itself public, which would end the right to a
trade secret, but rather making public the identity of the one
who controls the information. Therefore, with trade secrets, the
means of providing public notice for the purpose of creating
initial ownership rights is accomplished through the
requirement of taking security measures, which is, as stated, a
substitute for possession. But can a trade secret be regulated
through a registry after its ownership has been established by
means of security measures? Indeed, the existence of the
registry does not void the requirement to take security
measures.76 As such, the registry does not play a role as a factor
of public notice that replaces the requirement of retaining
possession (control). The proposed registry for trade secrets can
play the role of registries by improving the efficiency of
transactions in the right to the trade secret and in splitting the
right into secondary rights.
I have found that the initial ownership right of a trade
secret can be established by means of security measures, as a
substitute for possession demonstrated by public notice. The
question is whether the trade secret can be appropriately
regulated through a registry after the law has already
recognized the ownership of the owner who has taken security
measures. To answer this question, it may be stated that an
asset must have two main characteristics in order to be
regulated through the registry.77 First the transfer of rights to
the asset must occur infrequently. If the rights to an asset are
transferred too frequently (as in the case of diamonds), it is not
appropriate to regulate it through the registry because the
registration would have to be updated constantly. The trade
secret market is already slow because of its high transaction
costs, therefore the creation of a registry for conducting rights
transactions does not slow down the pace of their performance,
but rather improves their efficiency and increases the pace at
which they occur. Second the asset must be of a relatively high
value because of the high cost of using the registry method.
Payment of registration fees that are high relative to the low
Regarding the requirement to take security measures, see supra note 7.
76. Because it has additional reasons beyond being the factor of public
notice. See, e.g., Deutch, supra note 7, at 332-33.
77. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 74, at 304, 306.
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value of the asset is not efficient. The trade secrets of companies
are generally considered to be business assets of great value.78
The costs involved in maintaining a registry are covered by the
fees paid by companies using the registry. These costs are
justified if the registry improves the efficiency of the trade secret
transactions market and at the same time reduces litigation
costs. The proof is that private bodies, like the escrow
companies, which perform the first-level functions of the
proposed registry, operate as businesses and are financed by the
clients who use their services.
A. The Registry Structure
Registration in the proposed registry for trade secrets would
be carried out by sending encrypted information through the
Internet79 or over a direct line (point-to-point). The deposited
information would be saved encrypted even after its deposit with
the registry, so that the content of the registered trade secrets
remains secret from the public.80 The registration of trade
secrets would be renewed in real time. At any given time, the
information must be signed with an approved electronic
signature and deposited with the registrar of trade secrets. The
signature delineates the scope of the information, prevents
making changes to it, and ratifies the identity of the provider of

78. See Bone, supra note 4, at 243; Cheung, supra note 20, at 40; Deutch,
supra note 7, at 362; Epstein & Levi, supra note 2, at 887; Friedman, Landes
& Posner, supra note 4, at 61; Hill, supra note 2, at 2; Pamela Samuelson,
Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing
Decision in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 367 (1989); see
also Rockwell Graphic Sys. Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir.
1991).
79. Sending encrypted information through the Internet does not cause
publication of the information, and it therefore does not affect the suitability
of the information as a trade secret. See GRAHAM J. H. SMITH, INTERNET LAW
AND REGULATIONS 55 (3d ed. 2002).
80. The information is encoded by symmetrical encryption when the key
to the code is held by the depositor and the key for decoding the encryption by
the registrar of trade secrets (this in case the depositor is close enough to the
place of the registry in order to exchange keys), or by asymmetrical coding,
when the depositor codes the information with the public key of the registry of
trade secrets and the registrar decodes the information using his private
decoder.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/1

34

2014

TRADE SECRETS REGISTRY

489

the information81 and the date and time when the information
was deposited or updated. The secret information is updated in
a particular file and catalogued in the registry, so that each
update replaces the earlier one. The registrar of trade secrets
and his employees can peruse the registered trade secrets as
part of exercising various judicial powers, as described below.
The registrar of trade secrets would have the coding keys for the
purpose of carrying out these functions. The registrar would
have the authority of hiring experts in various fields to assist
him in exercising his judicial powers. The registrar, his
employees, and the experts who assist him in his work are bound
by a duty of confidentiality, similar to that of the registrar of
patents and his employees.
One of the key questions in establishing a registry is
whether it operates as a constitutive registry or simply as a
declarative one. In this regard, it is necessary to distinguish
between the creation of the initial right of ownership and
carrying out of transactions involving the right. In the case of a
constitutive registry, it is not possible to acquire the initial right
of ownership except through the registration.82 A declarative
registry, however, makes it possible to acquire initial ownership
rights even in the absence of registration. With respect to
transactions of assets, if the registry is constitutive, only
registration can create the property rights or confer their
validity to third parties.83 But in the case of declarative
registries, registration does not create the property right or
confer validity with respect to third parties, but merely declares
the existence of the transactions. In these registries, the
registration does not determine the identity of the owners at any
given moment.

81. The identification is by means of additional coding in which the
depositor codes the information with his private key and the registrar decodes
the information with the depositor’s public key. Success in decoding proves that
the information is that of the depositor and that it had not been altered after
it was sent. Another person trying to decode the information with the
depositor’s public key will not be able to access the information because it was
coded with symmetrical or asymmetrical coding, as stated. See supra note 80.
82. For example, it is possible to acquire the ownership right of a patent
only by registration with the patent registry.
83. With respect to patent transactions, see supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
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Constitutive registries have clear advantages when it comes
to transactions of rights.
For example, the constitutive
registration encourages owners of the rights to register their
rights. Registration with constitutive registries confers much
greater certainty regarding the state of the rights of the assets
at any given moment. This method, which ensures that
maximum rights to the asset are reflected in the registry,
strengthens the efficiency and trustworthiness of the registry.
Transactions that have not been registered undermine these
objectives. The reliability of the registry and its public nature
are important for actions conducted by government authorities.
They are also important for the benefit of citizens, so that at any
given moment they can ascertain the state of the rights of the
asset (with certain exceptions) that they are interested in
acquiring or receiving as collateral for a loan they intend to
grant.
Reliance on the registry requires that the asset
transactions be registered with it. Otherwise, it is impossible
for government authorities and citizens to rely on the
registrations. Therefore, giving the registry the power of a
constitutive registry creates rights that are much more effective
in achieving the objectives of the registry, i.e., the creation of a
public tool that accurately reflects the state of the asset rights
regulated by the registry, and enables users to rely on it.
Admittedly, there are declarative registries that are reliable, but
empowering a registry as a constitutive registry facilitates
reliance at a higher level. Moreover, one of the objectives of
creating a constitutive registry is to prevent a former owner from
deceitfully “selling” an asset.
Despite these advantages, a constitutive registry has
disadvantages as well. A mandatory determination of the date
of transfer of ownership deviates from the principle of freedom
to contract and does not allow the parties to set another date.
Another disadvantage is a slowing down of market transactions.
By its nature, a constitutive registry slows the speed of
transactions for assets subject to registration. Transfer of
ownership of the asset requires a change of registration, and
cannot be achieved by agreement or transfer of possession,
which are relatively quick procedures. The slowdown of the
transaction market is a disadvantage for assets in an otherwise
fast-moving transaction market, as in the case of the diamond
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industry, but not particularly significant for assets for which the
transaction market is already slow, regardless of the
constitutive nature of the registry that regulates rights.
The most important advantage of trade secrecy over patents
protection is creative flexibility. A severe disadvantage of the
patent system is the high administrative cost incurred before the
patent is issued. Moreover, the registration process is relatively
lengthy and inappropriate for information the economic value of
which lasts only a relatively short period of time. Preserving
flexibility in creating the right to trade secrecy requires that the
registry for trade secrets perform as a declarative registry in the
matter of the creation of the right. In other words, the operation
of the registry should not change the process of creating the right
as it exists at present. Meeting the preliminary conditions for
creating the right grants the creator of the information
ownership of the trade secret without any registration. The
public nature of the right, at this stage, is achieved through the
requirement to take security measures as a substitute for
possession.
To increase the trustworthiness of the registry, however,
and to enhance the legal certainty when carrying out
transactions in the rights to trade secrets, the registry should
operate as a constitutive registry only with regard to
transactions in this right. The registry should also make
possible the efficient division of the right into secondary rights.
These objectives are the primary justifications for the existence
of registries.84 Establishment of a registry will reduce concerns
about engaging in negotiations for rights to trade secrets, and
the risk of fraudulent transactions will decline considerably.
These procedures will also reduce transaction costs. Granting
constitutive powers to the registry in the matter of transactions
for a right will advance this objective. These objectives justify
the cost of the burden required to use registries. As noted, the
imposition of a duty for carrying out transactions in a certain
manner infringes on the freedom of contracts, and may slow
down the pace of transactions. But the concern for slowing down
the pace of transactions seems unjustified with regard to the
right to trade secrets. The transaction market in this field is not
84. See, in this regard, supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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as developed as it could be, not for lack of a desire to transact in
such assets but because of the amorphous nature of the right and
the lack of legal certainty in purchasing it. It seems, therefore,
that the proposed registry will not slow down the pace of
transactions in this right, but rather increase it through the
creation of much greater certainty, as shown below. A registry
that acts as a declarative registry in creating an initial
ownership right through possession and its substitutes, and as
a constitutive registry in carrying out transactions in that right
and creating secondary rights, is the most efficient registry from
among the three choices presented above. The registry for trade
secrets that I propose operates in accordance with this option,
i.e., as a declarative registry in the creation of initial ownership
rights and as constitutive one with regard to transactions in this
right and in the creation of secondary rights.
The advantage of flexibility operates not only when it comes
to the creation of initial ownership rights, but also with regard
to ownership rights to the secret information that continues to
be developed over time. A trade secret that is developed on an
on-going basis includes all its developments, without the need
for a formal process. To preserve the advantage of flexibility in
such a case, it is not sufficient to shape the proposed registry as
declarative when it concerns the creation of the right and as
constitutive when it comes to transactions in the right. After the
creation of the right, registration should take place with a high
frequency in order to keep the registration updated according to
the developments that have occurred in the trade secret.
Therefore, the proposed registry does not operate as a registry of
rights but strictly as a registry of transactions.
The essential difference between a registry of rights and a
registry of transactions is that in the former there is a
scrupulous examination, before the initial registration, of the
suitability of the asset for registration and of the identity of its
owners, whereas in the latter no such examination is
conducted.85 This choice is mandated by circumstances. As a
result of the scrupulous examination process before the initial
registration, the trade secrets law loses its advantage of
85. Based on this test, it may be stated that the patent registry is a
registry of rights. By contrast, the registries of security interests pursuant to
U.C.C. art. 9. are only transaction registries.
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flexibility and becomes similar in its essential features to the
system of patent laws. Therefore, trade secrets will be registered
automatically, without prior examination of whether the
information is qualified to be a trade secret, and without
ascertaining that the person doing the registration is the owner
of the trade secret. The registration itself does not constitute
proof that it is a trade secret. On the contrary, even in the
registries of rights it is possible to challenge the registration,
stating that the asset does not qualify for registration or that the
registered owner is not its true owner.86 The ability to challenge
exists, a fortiori, with regard to a transaction registry as a
registry of trade secrets, in which no preliminary examination is
conducted before the registration. The owner of the registered
trade secret is vulnerable to the possibility of being challenged
with the argument that the asset is not qualified to be a trade
secret or that he is not the owner of the trade secret. This
examination occurs only after the fact, in a hearing before the
registrar of trade secrets or in court.
Establishing the registry as declarative with regard to the
creation of the right, and as constitutive regarding transactions
in the right, and moreover, as a registry that operates only as a
transaction registry, preserves flexibility at the stage of the
creation of the right and inspires greater confidence in
conducting transactions in rights to trade secrets. The registries
generate confidence in the transactions of an asset arranged by
them by providing a guarantee to those who rely on the
registration and by eliminating the ability to deprive the owner
of his right without his consent.87 In the following parts, I
discuss the special rules to partially achieve these objectives.
The proposed registry serves two main types of registering
entities. The first includes companies or individuals who
register as owners of a trade secret. This type of registration is
intended to serve such actions as the sale of the trade secret, the
granting of a license for a trade secret, and the mortgaging of a
trade secret. According to trade secrets law, if two strangers
independently discover secret information, each of them
individually is considered the owner of the secret,88 and may
86. Regarding the registration of patents, see supra note 5.
87. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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register the trade secret under her name. Therefore, there is no
need for a mechanism, similar to that of a patents registry, that
examines who was first to register the trade secret.89 By
contrast, if the owner of a trade secret wishes to register another
trade secret, already having registered one trade secret, the
trade secret registrar, in order to prevent fraud, must ensure
that the latter registration is identical to the first one, as
described below.
The efficiency of the registry depends on it being constantly
updated. It is therefore of utmost importance that the transfer
of the right from a seller to a buyer be reflected in the registry.
Transactions that are not registered in the registry undermine
its purpose. Treating the trade secret registry as a constitutive
registry with regard to the registration of transactions would
provide incentives for the registration of transactions of trade
secrets. This, in turn, would increase the credibility and
improve the reliability of the registry. A transaction in a
registered trade secret that does not culminate in registration
would be void against any buyer, mortgagee, or licensee who
registered in good faith and for consideration, unless the first
transaction would be registered in the registry within three
months from the date on which it was executed or before the date
of the last purchase, mortgaging, or licensing.90
Because the proposed registry operates as a constitutive
registry for the purpose of conducting transactions in rights of
trade secrets, these transactions can be carried out only if the
trade secrets are registered in the registry. If a trade secret has
not yet been registered, the owner of the trade secret would be
required to register the secret under her name before she can
carry out transactions with respect to the secret. Similarly to
the first registration of trade secrets, transactions in a registered
trade secret would be possible only in electronic form, and
therefore it would be necessary to identify the contracting
parties.91 The possibility of carrying out transactions through
89. Because the right to a patent is an exclusive one, it requires an
arrangement with respect to the priority of registration.
90. Similar to the existing law concerning the transfer of a patent that
was not registered. See supra note 52.
91. The owner of the secret and the other party to the transaction (buyer,
licensee, lender who wishes to obtain a mortgage on the secret, etc.) identify
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electronic form does not stem from a requirement to carry out
the transactions quickly. Unlike the update of a registered trade
secret that develops on an ongoing basis and therefore requires
updating in real time, transactions in trade secrets do not
require such speed. The possibility, however, is necessary in
order to enable the registry to operate as an international
registry. Furthermore, the trade secret registry advances the
additional objective of a more efficient use of the asset by
splitting of the right into secondary rights.92
The second category of potential registering entities
includes companies and individuals who are also registered as
the owners of a trade secret. However this category is different
from the first in that together with the registration of ownership,
the names of individuals who have undertaken a contractual
obligation to maintain the secrecy of the registered information
is also be registered (hereinafter, the subordinates). The names
of the owners of the rights and of the subordinates would be open
to the general public. The registry indexes the names of the
owners of the various rights and of the subordinates. Anyone
may peruse the registry to check whether a person is subject to
a duty of confidentiality to someone else. The names of the
subordinates would remain registered even after ownership of
the secret has been transferred to another entity.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no trade secret
registry in any legal system in the form proposed here. This is
not surprising, because the main requirement for recognizing
information as a trade secret is the confidentiality of the
information, whereas a main objective for the establishment of
the registries is to make the registered information available to
the public.93 As noted, I propose a registry that is in part secret
themselves according to the normal procedure of identification of the provider
of information. See supra note 81. For the trend of development of land
registries that allow online transactions see Haim Sandberg, Real Estate EConveyancing: Vision and Risks 19 INFO. & COMM’S TECH. LAW 101 (2010).
92. See supra note 84.
93. Professor Miguel Deutch and Robert Dean noted that there is no
possibility of establishing a system of registration for trade secrets. Deutch,
supra note 7, at 361-63; DEAN, supra note 39, at 84. There were even those who
called the expression “public registration of trade secrets” an "oxymoron.” See
RALPH H. FOLSOM, MICHAEL W. GORDON & JOHN A SPANOGLE, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 889 (4th ed.
1999). But they referred to a registry where the assets registered, i.e., the
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and in part public. The information or know-how covered by the
trade secret would be kept in the secret part of the registry,
whereas the name of the owners and subordinates would be in
the public part. The role of the registry is to identify the owners
of the trade secret rights, or those who have undertaken to
maintain the confidentiality of the information, and to arrange
the transactions that are carried out in the rights to the trade
secrets, but not to disclose the secrets themselves.
Registration of information as a trade secret with the
proposed registry does not necessarily create the trade secret.
Nor does registration serve as proof that the registered
information is indeed a trade secret. The question whether the
registered information is a trade secret would only be
determined at a court hearing, based on the preliminary
requirements for the creation of a trade secret. The ability to
register a trade secret does not change these characteristics.
The registry does not create the right and the registration does
not confer a monopoly on the information, nor does it change the
nature of the right and the scope of the protection it grants.
trade secrets, would be open for public perusal, as in the case of the patent
registry. Such a registry is indeed impossible, because publication of the
secrets would expropriate the rights applicable to them. Professor Bone
proposed creating a registry of disclosed information in an information bank
that would constitute a substitute for the trade secret law method. See Bone,
supra note 2, at 125-28. Bone proposes a method similar to the patent method,
not a trade secret law method, and therefore it is not a registry for trade
secrets. The method suffers from some of the difficulties of patent law, and it
is therefore not a proper substitute for the method of trade secret law and
cannot take the place of the trade secret law. The registry proposed here is
intended to address some of the existing disadvantages of the trade secret law
and not to replace it with an entirely different system. Anderson suggested
creating a registry for trade secrets for secret inventions, to serve two purposes:
(a) prove that the owner of the secret deemed the information valuable and
intended to keep it secret, and (b) if a patent is awarded to another person for
the same invention, the registrant can continue using his invention based on
the law Anderson proposed. J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 973-77 (2011). I believe that the escrow companies
can accomplish these objectives today. Another proposal concerns the
registration of trade secrets, with minimal disclosure, for other purposes. See
Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2412-30 (1994); Jerome
Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2545-58 (1994). These proposals are different from the
system that I present in this article, which is aimed at solving entirely different
problems.
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Therefore, the proposed registry does not change the existing
balance in trade secret law between the public and the private
interest, and does not undermine the patent registry. The role
of the proposed registry is to reduce litigation costs in cases of
trade secret misappropriation by shortening the judicial process,
and thus increase employee mobility (because the judicial
decision is rendered before the new employment offer expires).
Moreover, the registry increases certainty and confidence in
transactions in trade secrets and reduces transaction costs,
leading directly to the growth of information mobility. The
increase in information mobility in an honest way, which helps
economic growth,94 also serves the rationale for a right to trade
secret based on considerations of business ethics and fair
competition.95
B. The Registry as a Tool for Public Notice
One of the central principles of property law is that of public
notice. When one is interested in imposing liability or obligation
on a third party who has no direct legal connection to the owner
of the right, it is necessary to provide tools for public notice that
can serve to warn the third party of the existence of rights on
which it may be infringing. The public source enables the third

94. Bone, supra note 4, at 266-67 n.115; Hyde, supra note 4; AnnaLee
Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and
Route 128, 71 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 199, 206 (1994). For a more reserved
approach, see also Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants not
to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999).
95. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481-82 (1974);
Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 763 F.2d 461, 467 (1st Cir. 1985); E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015-17 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971); R. B. STEVENSON, JR., CORPORATIONS AND
INFORMATION: SECRECY, ACCESS AND DISCLOSURE 19 (1980); Deutch, supra note
7, at 322, 358; Hill, supra note 2, at 2; Ramon Klitzke, Trade Secrets: Important
Quasi-Property Rights, 41 BUS. LAW. 555, 557 (1986); Christopher Rebel J.
Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 427, 435
n.23 (1995); Peterson, supra note 2, at 451 n.563; Sharp Paine, supra note 54,
at 250, 254-59; Wiesner & Cava, supra note 75; Steven Wilf, Trade Secrets,
Property and Social Relations, 34 CONN. L. REV. 787 (2002); see also UTSA § 1
cmt.; HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW AND
PUBLIC VALUES 101-02, 107 (1997) (emphasizing that the rationale behind the
right to trade secrecy is “propriety of means.”).
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party to become informed about the existence of the right. This
makes possible the imposition of liability and obligation on a
third party acting in good faith, if there is justification for doing
so. The four main public sources that the law recognizes are
registry, possession, notice, and government publications.96 As
noted, physical measures of security can be used as a public
source for the identity of the owner of the rights in trade secrets,
as a substitute for possession.97 Another tool that can serve as
a source for public notice is a notice of secrecy.98 These two
sources of public notice are intended for cases in which the secret
was appropriated by improper means, ignoring the physical
measures of security and the notice of confidentiality.99
The existence of a public source at the time the right was
created appears to be sufficient, even if the asset was transferred
to a third party who was not exposed to the public source. For
example, if a person breaks into a safe that was used as a
security measure and as a public source, and steals the trade
secrets from it, then transfers them to a third party, the third
party is not exposed to the public source. This is the situation
with regard to the possession of movable property. For example,
if a person steals a mobile phone and transfers it to a third party,
the owner can retrieve it from the third party even if the latter
was not exposed to the source of public notice – the possession.
Because of various policy considerations, the power invested in
the right to trade secret is different from that invested in
property rights (in rem): when the thief transfers a trade secret
to the third party, the latter is liable only if he knew, or should
96. Another relative and weakened source of public notice stems from the
characteristic of the secret itself. A person in a certain professional field who
comes across information of which he was not previously aware, can assume
that this is a trade secret even if he does not know who the owner of the rights
to the information is. A similar principle exists with respect to copyrights. The
existence of the work itself constitutes public notice as to its existence, even if
it does not disclose the identity of its owner, and even if it is not clear whether
the period of copyright protection has expired. Deutch, supra note 7, at 327,
363-64.
97. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
98. The reference is to the writing of the word “secret” on a document,
disc, at the beginning of a file, etc. The notice is also used as a tool of public
notice in copyright law by means of the “notice of copyright,” e.g., indicating
the name of the author and the year in which the work was created, with the
addition of the copyright symbol, “©.”
99. See UTSA § 1(2)(ii)(A).
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have known, at the time he received or used the information,
that this was a stolen trade secret.100
Frequently the two sources of public notice, security
measures and notice of confidentiality, are irrelevant. Most
secret information is not kept behind fences but it is rather
stored in the minds of employees who go home and who
occasionally change their place of employment. With regard to
this type of information, there is no significance to physical
security measures, either as a means of protecting the secret or
as a source of public notice of the right. In such cases, the most
common means of security is a contractual agreement (i.e., a
commitment to preserve confidentiality).101 Unlike the fence of
a factory, which warns a third party, contractual agreements are
not made public and therefore cannot serve as a source of public
notice. Therefore, the proposed registry of trade secrets also
functions as a third source of public notice.
In the proposed structure, each company can register, in a
separate registry cell, every employee who is bound by
confidentiality concerning the trade secrets to which he has been
exposed. The company is registered as the owner, and the
employee as subject to a duty of confidentiality to the owner of
the deposited trade secret. Updating the trade secrets to which
the employee has been exposed is carried out in real time
through encrypted communications. For example, software that
was written and updated by an employee is sent to his box in the
trade secret registry at the end of each workday through
encrypted communication, each update replacing the previous
one. When secret information is updated less frequently, the
trade secrets can be registered once a week, or on some other
cyclical basis, as decided by the company.102 For the purpose of
100. See supra note 39. See also Professor Deutch’s opinion according to
which this means of public notice (security measures) is sufficient to impose
liability even on a third party acting in good faith, in comparison to holding
chattel, if this power was indeed worthy in light of the policy considerations.
Deutch, supra note 7, at 329-30. For a different view, see DEAN, supra note 39,
at 83-84.
101. In this regard, see Rockwell Graphic Sys. Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc.,
925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991); Valco Cincinnati, Inc. v. N&D Machining
Serv. Inc., 492 N.E.2d 814, 819 (Ohio 1986).
102. Regarding the great importance of documenting trade secrets and
dating the information being developed, including the identity of the persons
exposed to trade secrets, and dating when they were exposed to the secret
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periodic deposits in the registry, companies must establish a
system for sending trade secrets to the registry. As I have
pointed out, some firms have already established such systems
in order to work with the escrow companies. Many companies
have created systems for sending large amounts of accumulated
information, including secret information, to external backup
sites.103 A similar mechanism can serve also to send secret
information to the trade secret registry.
Based on the experience of escrow companies and backup
sites, I conclude that companies are not concerned about sending
their secret information by encrypted communication or about
storing their secret information at the same site where many
other trade secrets are stored. Moreover, companies have
learned that asset management occasionally requires reliance
on other institutions that use security networks. For example,
almost all reasonable people and companies deposit one of their
most important assets – their monetary savings – in bank
accounts, despite the risk that the bank’s computer may be
broken into and account registries distorted, causing them
enormous damage. Reasonable people consider the risk vs. the
benefit and prefer to deposit their money in a bank because,
among other considerations, they have arrived at the conclusion
that elsewhere their money will be at an even greater risk.
There were no reports that depositors closed their accounts even
when bank computers were hacked and secret information
stolen. The concern over the misappropriation of trade secrets
from the company itself exceeds the risk of depositing these
secrets in the proposed registry. Moreover, depositing trade
secrets in the registry is intended, among others, to mitigate the
damage caused when the misappropriation of a trade secret
occurs by reducing the litigation costs incurred in such cases.

information, see 1 M. F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 5:19 (2008).
103. This phenomenon became common after the twin towers disaster, in
the wake of which many companies were obliterated because, in the absence of
off-site backups, all the information in their possession was destroyed.
Concerns about fire, terrorist attacks, war, computer viruses, and other
disasters served as the impetus for many companies to send their information
to backup sites outside the company. Given the great demand, at present many
companies provide backup services through encoded communication, so that at
the end of each workday all the information in the possession of the company,
including its secret information, is sent to the site of the backup company.
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Publicizing the identity of the individuals subject to the
right enables the employer, when interviewing new employees,
to query through the Internet the trade secret registry to make
sure that the new employee is not bound by confidentiality
toward a former employer. This possibility raises several
questions: (a) Do we expect the new employer to check the
registry as part of the interview process for hiring new
employees? (b) An affirmative answer to the first question
requires a decision regarding the rule to be applied if the
employer fails to check the registry. In my opinion, the answer
to the first question is derived from the answer to the second
question. As noted, the objective of the registration of those
subject to the right to a trade secret is to create a source of public
notice for the most common means of security: the obligation of
contractual confidentiality. This source of public notice is
intended to serve in cases when it is alleged that a third party
used the trade secret when he knew, or should have known, that
the secret was made available to him by someone who had used
it in violation of a contractual or fiduciary duty imposed upon
him vis-à-vis the owner of the secret.104 The term “should have
known” includes reasonable checks even if there was no
suspicion of infringement. As part of these checks, it is possible
to require an examination of public registries. In other words, a
new employer is considered a tortfeasor, having committed the
tort of misappropriation of a trade secret, even if he neither
knew nor suspected that his new employee disclosed to him
trade secrets of his previous employer, because it was possible
for the new employer to use the registry to discover the new
employee’s duty of confidentiality to his former employer, but he
failed to conduct such an examination.
It is therefore
appropriate to examine the question whether, in every
employment interview, the employer has a duty to check the
registry.
One possibility is to require an examination of the registry
only when hiring employees of certain occupations, when there
is a high risk that they may possess trade secrets belonging to
their previous employers. For example, the burden applies in
the hiring of a software engineer but not of a janitor.

104. See UTSA § 1(2)(ii)(B)(III).
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Furthermore, the burden applies to senior employees about
whom it may be assumed that they possess trade secrets, but not
to junior employees. The hiring process generally tends to be
lengthy and involves several interviews and tests, especially in
the case of high-tech professionals and senior executives.
Therefore, the burden of checking the registry does not affect the
speed of recruiting new employees. Another possibility is to
impose a general obligation to conduct an examination, to avoid
litigation costs if there is a question of whether the nature of the
position or the seniority of the employee mandated an
examination of the registry.
The proposed trade secret registry completes the set of
requirements for public notice of the right to trade secrets. The
physical measures of security and the notice of confidentiality
constitute a source of public notice for those who appropriate the
secret through improper means. In any event, those who use the
secret in violation of a contractual or fiduciary duty do not need
a source of public notice because they are aware of the existence
of the right. The trade secret registry constitutes a source of
public notice for persons who suspect that they have received the
secret from someone who has breached a contractual obligation
to maintain confidentiality. The source of public notice created
by the trade secret registry can assist in preventing fraudulent
transactions, in which a former employee tries to sell his former
employer’s secret to the former employer’s competitors. The
three sources together form a web of public notice that enables
the owner of a trade secret to warn the public of any
infringements. This reduces the employment costs, because it
reduces concerns about hiring new employees and about the
disclosing trade secrets to them.
C. The Registry as a Tool for Resolving Disputes and Reducing
the Evidentiary Gap Between the Parties
In this part, I discuss the ability of the proposed registry to
assist in the second stage, where the new employer does not
want to assume the risk of committing the tort of trade secret
misappropriation. To this end, he examines the registry,
becoming aware of his new employee’s obligation of
confidentiality to the trade secret right of his former employer.
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For example, if a software developer registered the secret code
that the former employee developed for him, when the employee
moves to a new place of employment, the new employer can
learn, through a query to the registry, that as the developer of
the program, the employee was subject to a duty of
confidentiality to his former employer. If the new employer
decides to use the trade secrets regardless, not only does he
assume the risk of paying damages to the former employer for
the prohibited use, but he is also subject to injunctions that will
prevent him from using the secret in the future despite his
investments and his reliance on the secret. An employer who
does not want to risk an action for damages, an injunction, and
injury to his reputation must ask the previous employer whether
the former employee’s new work infringes upon his trade secrets.
Because in most cases the answer is expected to be in the
affirmative, the new employer or the former employee must
request the registrar of trade secrets to hold an expedited
judicial proceeding to answer the following questions: (a) Is the
registered information indeed a trade secret of the former
employer?105 (b) Is the former employee prevented from working
for a competitor, and if so, for how long?
The former employee can raise several claims in his defense:
(a) the secret information, toward which he has a duty of
confidentiality according to the registration in the registry, does
not meet the definition of a trade secret (if this claim is accepted,
the former employee can request the registrar of trade secrets to
expunge the secret information in question); (b) the registered
owner of the registered trade secret is not the true owner; (c) the
general professional skills exception applies in this case;106 (d)
the trade secret is not related to the work at the new place of
employment.
The law establishing the registry must grant the registrar
of trade secrets several judicial powers for the purpose of making
determinations in these cases. Concentration of judicial powers
in this field of expertise in the hands of a judicial entity
specializing in this area makes possible the development of
105. Sharp Paine noted that frequently disagreements arise whether
given information meets the definition of a trade secret as well as about the
identity of the owner of the secret. Sharp Paine, supra note 54, at 260.
106. See supra note 11.
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unique judicial expertise, similar to that of a registrar of patents.
These judicial powers do not remove the jurisdiction of the courts
to adjudicate claims of trade secret misappropriation that are
not related to the ex ante restriction of occupation. Claims
regarding the limitation of occupation require, by their nature,
quick resolution. Therefore, in cases in which the claim for
restriction of occupation fails, the offer of new employment is
still relevant.
The speed of the judicial process is determined by several
factors. One such factor limits the employer to claims for
restriction of occupation only with regard to trade secrets that
have been registered before the employee’s departure from his
previous place of employment.
This limitation provides
companies with the incentive to register separately the trade
secrets that each employee knows. By means of the registry, it
is possible to know the date on which a trade secret was
deposited, as well as the scope of the information deposited by
the owner of the trade secret regarding the employee subject to
the duty of confidentiality. The certification of the registrar of
trade secrets regarding the scope of the information deposited as
of a given date constitutes prima facie evidence, or alternatively,
absolute evidence regarding the scope of the information at that
time. The limitation of claims for restriction of occupation
concerning a former employee to only those trade secrets that
the former employer registered in the name of the employee
before his leaving is intended to prevent situations in which
companies claim that the employee knows trade secrets to which
in practice he was not exposed, only in order to prevent the
employee from moving to a competitor. A substantial number of
claims against former employees are filed before the beginning
of their work at the new place of employment, based on the claim
that the employee is expected to breach his obligation of
confidentiality. At times, even if the former employer does not
succeed in his claim of restriction of occupation, by virtue of the
duration of the litigation he achieves his objective, which is to
block the employee from moving to a competitor.107 Naturally,
this limitation does not prevent the former employer from suing
107. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Regarding problems that
arise in the absence of a formal dimension of the scope of protected information,
see Deutch, supra note 7, at 365.
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the former employee or any other entity on the grounds of trade
secret misappropriation that occurred in practice, even if the
trade secrets were not registered in the registry. For example,
if it transpires that the former employee is indeed using trade
secrets, the former employer can sue both the former employee
and the new employer for trade secret misappropriation and on
other grounds as well, and in addition to damages can obtain
injunctions to prevent the continued use of the trade secrets
(including restriction of occupation), but cannot obtain an ex ante
order of restriction of occupation.108 Therefore, the requirement
of registration in order to be able to sue for ex ante restriction of
occupation does not negate the ex post defense of trade secrets
that were not registered.
The defense of these secrets is possible only if trade secret
misappropriation actually occurred. Obtaining an order for ex
ante restriction of occupation is possible only with respect to
trade secrets registered before the employee has left the place of
previous employment. If the previous employer believes that the
trade secrets in his possession are so valuable that restricting
the occupation of the former employee and denying him his
livelihood are justified, only because of concern that in the future
she may make use of these trade secrets, the employer should
take the trouble to register the trade secrets by means of online
communication, even if this requires accommodating
registration in real time (a process that already exists in many
companies for the purpose of off-site backups or deposits with
escrow companies, as noted above). This arrangement prevents
extensive restrictions imposed on the mobility of employees by
means of exaggerated claims that turn out to be baseless, but
that achieve their goal of blocking the employee from
transferring to a new employer because of the time that it takes
to litigate such claims in court. Making it more difficult to file
claims for restriction of occupation is also consistent with the
tendency of the courts to limit the restriction of occupation of
former employees,109 and with studies that point to the fact that
108. Proceedings in claims of trade secret misappropriation that
happened in practice can be adjudicated before the registrar of trade secrets or
before the court.
109. Regarding the tendency of the courts to limit the restriction of
occupation, see Sharp Paine, supra note 54, at 260.
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the limitation of the restriction of occupation and the resulting
increase in employee mobility, increase the mobility of
information and assists in economic development.110
As noted, one of the roles of the registry is streamlining the
judicial process. To promote this goal, two alternatives may be
examined to forestall arguments that are likely to be raised by
the former employee: (a) establish that the former employee
cannot claim that he was not exposed to a trade secret registered
in his name before leaving his former job; and (b) establish the
presumption that the former employee was indeed exposed to a
trade secret registered in his name before leaving. The existence
of the presumption shifts the burden of proof to the employee,
who must prove that he was not exposed to the secret registered
in his name.111 Each alternative has an advantage and a
disadvantage. An irrefutable presumption saves litigation costs,
but does not permit the employee to prove that he was not
exposed to the secret. A refutable presumption enables the
employee to prove that he was not exposed to the secret, but this
nearly eliminates the narrowing of the evidentiary gap and
reinstates the attendant litigation costs.
One of the concerns with the proposed arrangement is that
the company might register trade secrets under the name of
employees who are not exposed to these secrets only in order to
lengthen the litigation if these employee leave, with the objective
of delaying the employees’ move to competitors. In such a case,
the employees will also be prevented from claiming that they
were not exposed to the trade secret or that they will bear the
burden of proof to refute the presumption (in accordance with
the arrangement chosen). To address this concern, it is proposed
that in ex ante claims for restriction of occupation, the former
employee (the defendant) be able to receive the information
registered in his name in the registry. This information would
be exposed only at the judicial proceeding, subject to an order
prohibiting its publication.112 On the face of it, the company may
110. See supra note 94.
111. See JAGER, supra note 102 at § 5:19. Jager determines that
documentation in real time that a certain person was exposed to the secret
information constitutes trustworthy evidence that such person had indeed
access to the information.
112. Regarding the constitutional problem regarding laws enabling the
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be tempted, during the period of employment, to register under
the employee’s name trade secrets of which he was not aware,
merely in order to improve its position in future litigation. But
it may be assumed that the company is not interested in doing
so because such secrets would have to be exposed in the court
proceedings. Although an order would prohibit publication, the
company would be assuming an unnecessary risk by exposing
secrets unknown to the employee merely to strengthen its claim,
especially if the information is to be disclosed to the employee in
the course of the dispute with the company. This should deter
the company from registering in the name of employees
information to which they were not exposed. The proposed
arrangement takes into account considerations of freedom of
occupation of the defendant and prevents baseless claims
against former employees. The arrangement also protects the
trade secrets of the company, which would be exposed only in the
course of the judicial process and subject to the order prohibiting
their publication.
The proposed registry significantly reduces the evidentiary
gap between the parties regarding the most important issue: the
secrets to which the former employee was exposed. The registry
does so through a mechanism that establishes the facts with
absolute certainty, or prima facie, depending on the
arrangement chosen.
Such a mechanism can render
unnecessary hearing the question whether the employee indeed
knew the secrets. The issues remaining to be determined by the
trade secrets registrar or the court are: Is the registered
information indeed the former employer’s trade secret? If it is,
can it prevent the employee’s move to a competitor, and if so, for
what period of time?
Reduction in the duration of the litigation necessarily
reduces the litigation costs, which is one of the goals of the
proposed trade secret registry. I noted above that escrow
companies provide a service to companies that deposit secret

granting of a prohibition of publication with respect to trade secrets that are
disclosed in a judicial proceeding, in terms of freedom of expression, see State
ex rel. Sports Mgmt. News, Inc. v. Nachtigal, 921 P.2d 1304 (Or. 1996). For
criticism of this decision, see Nicole M. Rhoades, The Constitutional Shaping
of Oregon’s Trade Secret Law: State ex rel. Sports Management News v.
Nachtigal, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 629 (1999).
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information in order to prove that the information was in their
possession when the former employee worked there. Such a
deposit can prevent arguments by the former employee that the
information was created after he left the company and that the
information was not known to the company when he worked
there. The escrow companies make it possible for companies to
deposit their secret information without specifying separately
the scope of the secret information known to each employee.
When the company does not create an individual deposit, there
is no solution for two situations: one in which the company
falsely claims that the employee knew the secrets to which in
reality he was not exposed; two, a former employee falsely claims
that he was not exposed to the secrets which were known to the
company. The problem can be solved if the company creates an
individual deposit for each employee, which is currently feasible
at a reasonable cost as part of the service provided by the escrow
companies. The law, however, would have to create legal
incentives to encourage the companies to update the
registration, and a legal deterrence to discourage overregistration. The proposed trade secret registry can offer the
same services as the escrow companies, with the additional
advantages of the mechanism that provides an incentive for
companies to engage in individual, updated, and accurate
registration (prevention of over-registration).
Thus, the
proposed registry narrows the evidentiary gap between the
parties. Moreover, the services of the escrow companies do not
provide a solution for cases in which a new employer does not
know that the potential employee is bound by a duty of
confidentiality toward his former employer or his proxies. The
proposed trade secret registry enables the deposit of trade
secrets, similarly to the escrow companies, and also constitutes
an open registry for the identity of the owners of the secrets and
of those bound to them by a duty of confidentiality. As noted
above, functioning as an open registry for those identities makes
possible the creation of a source of public information for
contractual obligations to preserve confidentiality.
D. Registration of the Transfer of a Trade Secret
The most serious problem faced by an owner who is
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interested in transferring113 or licensing a trade secret, is the
Arrow disclosure paradox, which affects negotiations about
secret information. According to the paradox, the owner of a
trade secret will not agree to reveal the secret in negotiations
unless the potential buyer or licensee commits not to disclose or
use the secret information in the event that no agreement is
reached (an NDA). But, the potential buyer or licensee will
refuse to sign such a commitment, out of concern that he has
already developed or can develop the information by selfdiscovery or reverse engineering, at a lower cost than the
requested consideration. This fact cannot be ascertained before
the disclosure of the secret in the course of negotiations. The
paradox results in the failure of efficient transactions from the
outset.
I already noted that private escrow companies offer a
solution to the paradox by enabling a company (or individual) to
deposit the information to be offered in the negotiations to prove
before the negotiations that the seller is the owner of the
information. Such a deposit can also protect the offeree company
because the commitment not to use the information to be
disclosed in the negotiations applies only if the information was
deposited by the offeror before the negotiations began and was
not deposited by the offeree company as part of a routine deposit.
Such evidence is important given the existing exception in
commitments not to use information disclosed in negotiations,
which provides that the commitment does not apply to
information known to the offeree before the beginning of
negotiations. The arrangement of the escrow companies,
however, resolves only some of the problems presented. For
example, it does not resolve the problem of a former employee
offering a third party to acquire from him his former employer’s
113. An argument can be made that given that a sale is the acquisition of
an asset, i.e., the owner transfers the asset to the buyer in such a manner that
the asset is removed from its previous owner, it is not possible to sell a trade
secret because the asset, i.e., the secret information, remains part of the
knowledge of the seller. Milgrim is of the opinion, however, that despite this
problem, case law, which recognizes the transfer of a trade secret, attests to
the fact that the elasticity of common law meets the challenge of such an
amorphous transfer. MILGRIM, supra note 36, vol. 1, § 2.02[1], at 2-43. See the
long list of case law cited there. If a transfer is accompanied by an explicit or
implicit commitment not to use the trade secret that was sold, the transaction
is similar to a sale.
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trade secret by claiming that he owns it. Therefore, companies
that conduct negotiations with a person representing himself as
the owner of a trade secret cannot be certain that the trade
secret is his, even if he deposited it beforehand with an escrow
company. A registry that combines the deposit of trade secrets
that remain secret, registration of the names of the owners of
rights and of those bound by the same rights, available for public
perusal, and the creation of rules to be used to adjudicate
competing rights, resolves this problem, as well as others
described below.
As part of the proposed arrangement, if an inventor wishes
to transfer secret information to a company he must register the
information in the registry before the start of negotiations. If
the negotiations are unsuccessful and it transpires that the
company began using the secret information, and that it had not
registered similar information before the negotiations, the
inventor has an evidentiary presumption that the company
received the secret from him. This is not an irrefutable
presumption because self-discovery according to the law grants
the company the right to its own trade secret. But in the absence
of registration on its part, and the existence of registration by
the inventor before the negotiations, it can be assumed that the
latter disclosed the information in the unsuccessful negotiations
and the company received the information and used it illegally.
This presumption can be refuted if the company proves that the
information was in its possession before to the negotiations. In
such a case, the company would be entitled to the same right as
the one with whom it entered into negotiations.114 Encouraging
the registration of information that was developed or discovered
also helps narrow the evidentiary gap and lower the transaction
costs. Moreover, the owner of the secret can disclose the

114. This arrangement is also consistent with the existing law, according
to which in certain cases the obligation to preserve the secrecy of information
disclosed in negotiations can apply to the offeree, even in the absence of such
a commitment on its part. For example, this obligation applies if the offeree
was warned in advance that the owner of the secret expects it to be kept secret,
and the offeree failed to refuse to receive it. It is true that if the information
was in the possession of the offeree before the negotiations, he is entitled to
continue to use it based on substantive law, but the burden of proof of this
claim is on him. For an analysis of various cases and the law applicable to
them. See supra notes 20-21.
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information as part of the negotiations, with greater, if not
complete, assurance, even without a prior contractual duty to
maintain confidentiality.
If a voluntary sale is at issue, it is possible to include in the
transfer agreement a prohibition preventing the former owner
of the secret from using the trade secret herself, reselling it to
another, or disclosing it to the public. Even if there is no explicit
contractual duty, some are of the opinion that this is an implicit
duty. In the absence of this restriction, the seller can easily
cause a decrease in the value of the secret that she has already
transferred.115
According to the law to be applied to the trade secret
registry, the transfer of ownership of an unregistered trade
secret is void vis-à-vis any buyer, licensee or holder of a
mortgage who acted in good faith and for consideration, unless
the transfer was registered in the registry within three months
of the date of transfer or before the date of purchase, licensing
or mortgaging.116 Another possible way of resolving the conflict
between the transfer of an unregistered ownership and a later
mortgage or license that was registered in good faith and for
consideration is for the buyer to receive the ownership of the
trade secret, but subject to the mortgage or license that was
registered.
When the owner intends to transfer his trade secret, he
must also register as the owner of the trade secret with the
registry, and after the completion of the sales contract, the buyer
is registered as the “current owner,” and the seller’s registration
changes from “current owner” to “previous owner.” The transfer
of registration transfers the ownership right of the secret to the
buyer. Because the registry of transactions conducts no
115. In this regard, see also MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF
RESTRAINT OF TRADE: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 11-12, 35 (1986).
Trebilcock notes how courts historically rationalized restriction of occupation
as the result of the sale of a business more easily than restriction of occupation
in employee-employer relations. See also PERRITT, supra note 39, at 295-99;
Bone, supra note 4, at 252 n.56. In the sale of a business, the bargaining power
is more equal and the profit from the sale enables the seller to engage in some
other gainful employment. Bus. Records Corp. v. Lueth, 981 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.
1992); Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Danahy, 488 N.E.2d 22, 28 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1986).
116. This is similar to the law that applies to the unregistered transfer of
ownership of patent. See supra note 52.
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examination before registration regarding the suitability of the
asset to be registered or the identity of the real owner, the buyer
is always exposed to the allegation that the seller was not the
real owner of the trade secret or that the information was not a
trade secret. At present, this fact does not prevent the registry
from recognizing the seller’s ownership as long as the contrary
has not been proven.
If the owner has several registered trade secrets, the trade
secrets registrar must ascertain that the buyer is registered as
the owner of the registered trade secret that he acquired
according to the agreement. Recognizing the transfer of a trade
secret, or any other transaction involving a secret, only if it is
carried out through the registry would it bolster the confidence
in the transactions of trade secrets. The seller’s duty to be
registered as the owner of the secret in the registry in the first
place, and retaining his name as the “former owner” even after
the registration is entered in the name of the buyer, will bring
about the disclosure of fraudulent transactions in which the
former owner tries to resell the secret – one of the most deterring
risks in trade secret transactions.117 According to the procedures
of the proposed registry, a former owner of a trade secret who
tries to resell the secret would have to register again as the
owner of the trade secret. For every initial registration, the
registrar of trade secrets would check whether the potential
registree has not already transferred the trade secret to a third
party in the past. If it transpires that the potential registree has
already transferred the trade secret in the past, the trade secret
registrar must confirm that the trade secret that the seller
wants to register is not the secret that was transferred by him
in the past. If the trade secret registrar discovers that the
information is similar, she should not permit the former owner
to register again as the owner of the secret, and prevent the
fraudulent transfer before it is completed.118 Constitutive
registration of transactions concerning the right to the secret,
and preserving the identity of past owners in the registry, assists
117. MILGRIM, supra note 36, at 2-43. See also supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
118. The trade secret registrar generally does not permit a person to
register his secret a second time (or to register a secret that he already sold to
someone else) even independently of any attempt to sell the secret.
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in achieving this goal.
An attempt to transfer the secret to somebody else by being
employed by the transferee and represent oneself as the owner
of the secret is doomed to fail. As noted, as part of the sale
transaction, the seller has the duty not to disclose the secret
after the sale. At the time of hiring, the new employer must
examine the registry to verify that the new employee has not
sold trade secrets in the past. Such an examination would reveal
that the employee has already sold the trade secret. In such a
case, the new employer would act in the same way as the
employer who discovers that the potential new employee is
subject to a duty of confidentiality toward his former employer,
as described in Section C, supra. If the new employer does not
examine the registry, he is considered to be someone who should
have known that he is receiving a stolen trade secret and is
therefore committing a tort of trade secret misappropriation.
The duty to register as the owner of the secret is also
intended to prevent another type of fraud. For example, a
former employee could offer to sell a trade secret of his former
employer to a competitor without disclosing the source of the
secret. Because the employee needs to be registered as the
owner of the trade secret, the trade secret registrar must check
whether the potential registree is subject to a duty of
confidentiality toward a third party. If the trade secret registrar
discovers the former employee’s registration, he must check
whether the secret, which the former employee seeks to register
as an owner, is different from the secret already registered to the
former employee. If it transpires that it is a similar secret, the
trade secret registrar should not permit the registration of the
employee as the owner, thereby preventing the transaction
before it is carried out. At the same time, the good faith of the
competitor is also refuted.
In Part VI, I examined the Indonesian law, which is the only
official arrangement, to the best of my knowledge, that deals
with the registration of the identity of transferees and licensees,
and of their rights to trade secrets. This law creates a unique
arrangement, according to which the transfer or licensing of a
trade secret must be in writing, and must be registered with the
Office of the Directorate General of Intellectual Property in the
Indonesian Ministry of Justice. After the deposit, a notice
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announcing the transfer or licensing is published in the special
trade secrets gazette. The transfer or licensing of a trade secret
that was not registered with the intellectual property office has
no validity vis-à-vis third parties.
But as noted, this
arrangement offers only a partial solution. If, by perusal of the
gazette, C knows that in the past A sold a trade secret to B, and
now A offers C to buy the trade secret, claiming that this is a
different trade secret, C cannot know that A is deceiving him
and that he is trying to sell a secret that he has already sold to
B (clearly, C has no right to see the secret that was sold to B).
The problem with the Indonesian law is that trade secrets for
which transactions were carried out that were not deposited
with an objective entity can compare between trade secrets
involved in past transactions and those offered in new
transactions by parties to the earlier transactions. The trade
secret registry proposed here requires the deposit of trade
secrets for which transactions are carried out, and not only the
transfer or licensing agreements, as required in Indonesia.
According to the present proposal, the trade secrets registrar has
the judicial power to act as the objective entity that would
examine whether fraudulent transactions are being conducted.
Reduction of the risks in carrying out trade secret
transactions and an increase in certainty of lower transaction
costs are objectives of the proposed trade secret registry. But
such examinations do not resolve situations in which the former
owner, who has already sold her secret, or an employee who
undertook a commitment to keep the information confidential,
approaches someone else who registers in their place in order to
sell the secret. This loophole is not a negligible one, and it
appears to jeopardize the many advantages of the registry. The
response to this loophole must be considered in view of the
current situation. In light of existing law, it is easy to carry out
fraudulent transactions at present, without need to include
additional entities. Inclusion of another entity places the
fraudulent activity at a high risk. Moreover, the need for
another person to register with the registry and to disclose his
identity, so that if the plot is discovered after the fact he bears
liability for the damage, can deter him from participating in it.119
119. Regulation of the asset through the registry makes it more difficult
to take the asset from its owner without his consent. Baird & Jackson, supra
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In any case, if nevertheless a person fraudulently registers
as the owner and sells the secret to a purchaser, when it later
becomes clear that the person who registered as the owner of the
trade secret was not its real owner, the one who purchased from
her in good faith and for consideration will be liable vis-à-vis the
true owner, but the circumstances of the purchase will grant
discretion to the court to exempt the buyer in good faith and for
consideration from remedies in various amounts.120 This
arrangement, however, does not appear to solve the problem
when the potential buyer cooperates with the former seller or
former employee who proposes to sell him the trade secret
surreptitiously. In my opinion, many companies are not
interested in knowingly taking part in the misappropriation of a
trade secret. If the scheme is revealed, they will be liable for
damages to the owner of the trade secret and their reputation is
seriously damaged. As noted, companies fear confrontations
with owners of trade secrets who offer their secret for sale in
negotiations to such an extent that they do not even engage in
such negotiations or require the owner of the secret to sign a
waiver of his rights, except for his rights pursuant to copyright
or patent laws, or they consent to purchase the secret at a very
low price, which does not make economic sense for the owner of
the secret.121 It appears, therefore, that in most cases the
companies to whom such a scheme is offered would refuse to
cooperate with those who misrepresent themselves as owners of
a trade secret and offer to sell it surreptitiously.
E. Registration of a License for a Trade Secret
A licensing transaction is an accepted transaction in trade
secret law.122 The owner of the secret can grant an exclusive or
note 74, at 300, 305, 310.
120. See supra note 12. Regarding the English and the Australian laws,
see also supra note 39.
121. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
122. A known example of a license for a trade secret is the case involving
the decision in Warner-Lambert Pharm. Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F.
Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff’d, 280 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960). In this case, a
license was granted in 1880 for a trade secret, the formula for a disinfectant
liquid called “Listerine,” and the agreement was that the licensee and his heirs
would pay royalties to the licensor and his heirs. Id. at 658. Royalties were
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a non-exclusive license for the use of the trade secret.123 The
question arises whether it is appropriate to grant standing to
sue a third party only to someone who holds an exclusive license
or also to a non-exclusive license holder. In accordance with US
law, an exclusive licensee can sue for infringement of the trade
secret for which he holds the license, but afterwards he must
include the licensor in the action.124 In Germany, the owner of
the trade secret and the exclusive licensee can sue for breach
without joining one another, but neither of them has the
obligation to sue, unless it is required by the licensing
agreement. In Belgium, the right to sue for breach is exclusively
that of the licensor, and he has a duty to initiate such
proceedings.125 Thus, we should make the right to sue a third
party that of the owner of the trade secret and of the exclusive
licensee who is registered as such.
In accordance with the policies of the registry, every license
for a trade secret, whether it is exclusive or not, must be
registered in order for the licensee’s right to be valid with respect
to third parties and for him to have the right to sue a third party.
A license for a trade secret that has not been registered would
be void vis-à-vis a buyer or mortgagee who registered in good
faith and for consideration, unless the license was registered
with the registry within three months from the date of its being

paid for decades, until in 1956, the court was asked to order the cessation of
the royalty payments for the formula, which had already been published in a
journal in 1931. Id. at 667. The court determined that although the secret had
been disclosed, the royalties must continue to be paid because there was no
provision in the contract for the cessation of royalty payments. Id. at 668.
There were even those who asserted that based on this decision, trade secret
law is preferable to patent law. A license for a patent would have expired at
the end of the patent period. R.M. Halligan, Trade Secret Licensing: The
‘Listerine’
Formula
Case
(1998),
http://tradesecretshomepage.com/license.html. It seems, however, that it
would have been appropriate to interpret the contract as ending when the
trade secret expired.
123. When granting an exclusive license in which the licenser and the
licensee are actual or potential competitors, in the US it is necessary to take
into consideration the Justice Department Guidelines on License Restriction,
available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm, one of the aims of
which is to prevent restriction of trade. See, PERRITT, supra note 39, at 160-65.
124. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
125. Id.
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granted or before the date of the acquisition or mortgage.126 This
rule can be expanded so that a license that was not registered
would also not be valid against a later license that was
registered in good faith and for consideration.127
In the context of the registry, the name of the licensee is
registered next to the name of the owner of the secret. In cases
in which the owner of the secret has several registered trade
secrets, the trade secrets registrar must ensure that the licensee
is registered only with respect to the registered trade secret for
which the licensing agreement was reached. To protect the
owner of the secret, it is possible to require the licensee to
register his employees who are bound to maintain
confidentiality with respect to the trade secrets to which they
are privy as a result of the license, in a manner similar to the
arrangement discussed in Section B, supra.128
In the previous parts, I discussed the existing risks for the
126. This is similar to the law applying to the unregistered transfer of
ownership of a patent. See supra note 52. Admittedly, pursuant to the patent
law, the rule of purchase in good faith and for consideration does not apply to
a licensee who did not register, but only to a transfer of ownership that was
not registered. As a result, a later purchaser in good faith is subject to the
earlier license to the patent that was not registered. This distinction stems
from the wording of section 261, not from any substantive rationale. See In re
Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001); Moraine Prods. v.
ICI Am. Inc., 538 F.2d 134, 143 (7th Cir. 1976); Sanofi v. Med-Tech
Veterinarian Prods., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931, 939 (D.N.J. 1983); David J.
Dykeman & Daniel W. Kopko, Recording Patent License Agreements in the
USPTO, INTELL. PROP. TODAY 18-19 (Aug. 2004); Einhorn, supra note 51, at 2.
Moreover, the existing distinction in patent law grants the licensee who did
not register a stronger right than to a buyer who did not register. Because there
is no substantive rationale for this circumstance, in the proposed trade secrets
registry the rule of purchase in good faith and for consideration also applies to
the licensee who did not register.
127. Admittedly, it has been noted with respect to a license for a patent
that if there are clashing licenses, the first license would have priority over the
second license even if the second licensee was not aware of the first license.
Dykeman & Kopko, supra note 126. But I am of the opinion that because this
distinction stemmed from the wording of section 261, and because there is no
rationale for it, in the case of the proposed trade secrets registry priority should
be given to the later licensee who registered in good faith and for consideration
over the earlier licensee who did not register.
128. Regarding the importance of the arrangements in the licensing
agreement, which require the licensee to ensure that his employees undertake
to maintain secrecy, see DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS,
UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 3-56 (Matthew Bender ed.,
1992).
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owner of the secret and for the licensee in the transaction. An
exclusive licensee assumes the risk that the owner of the secret
will continue to grant licenses, in violation of his commitment.129
The proposed trade secret registry can solve this problem. The
owner of the secret cannot register an additional license for a
trade secret for which an exclusive license has already been
registered, nor can he be registered again as the owner of that
trade secret to be able to grant an additional license, as stated
in Section A, supra. If the second licensee is not registered, he
takes the risk that the license will not be valid vis-à-vis third
parties, as stated above. A further risk exists for the owner of
the secret, if the licensee represents himself before a third party
as the owner of the trade secret, trying to sell the secret to a
third party.130 As with every transaction in a trade secret, the
licensee must first register as the owner of the trade secret. The
registrar of trade secrets examines whether the potential
registrant is registered as the licensee of a registered trade
secret. To reveal the registration of the licensee, the trade
secrets registrar must examine whether the trade secret for
which the licensee wishes to register as the owner of the trade
secret is different from the registered trade secret for which he
already received a license. If it turns out that the secret
information is similar, the trade secrets registrar would not
permit the licensee to be registered as the owner and thereby
prevents a deceptive transaction before it comes to fruition. An
attempt to transfer the secret to somebody else by being
employed by the transferee and represent oneself as the owner
of the secret is doomed to fail. As part of the licensing
transaction, there is usually an obligation on the part of the
licensee not to disclose the secret. At the time of hiring, the new
employer would have to check the registry to determine whether
the new employee is registered as a licensee of a trade secret.
Such an examination would reveal that the employee is indeed
registered as a licensee. In this case, the new employer can act
in a similar manner as in the case in which it transpires that the
potential new employee is bound by confidentiality toward his
former employer. As stated in Section C, supra, if the new
employer does not examine the registry, he will be considered to
129. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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be someone who should have known that he is receiving a stolen
trade secret, and therefore, he is committing the tort of trade
secret misappropriation. If the license is registered, the licensee
would not be able to sell the trade secret through the registry, as
noted above. In the case of more sophisticated fraud, in which
the licensee transfers the secret to someone else to be registered
in his stead, when it later transpires that the one who is
registered as the owner of the trade secret was not the true
owner, the purchaser in good faith and for consideration would
be liable to the true owner, but the circumstances of the
purchase grant discretion to the court to exempt the purchaser
in good faith and for consideration from remedies in various
amounts.131 A similar rule can also be created for cases in which
a person is registered as the owner of the trade secret, despite
the fact that he is not the true owner and he grants another
person a license to the secret. In this case, the licensee in good
faith and for consideration is liable to the true owner, but the
circumstances of receipt of the license grant discretion to the
court to exempt the licensee in good faith and for consideration
from remedies in various amounts.132
131. See supra note 12. With respect to English and Australian laws, see
also supra note 39.
132. With respect to receiving a license to a patent, in Heidelberg Harris,
Inc. v. Loebach, 145 F. 3d 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the court applied the rule of
the buyer in good faith and for consideration to a licensee of a patent who
received an exclusive license without knowing that the licensor acquired his
interest in the patent fraudulently. But in Rhone-Paulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb
Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the court took the position that
because of the special circumstances of the Heidelberg case, as well as the fact
that the parties were not in disagreement on the subject, Heidelberg is not
binding regarding the question whether the rule of a buyer in good faith and
for consideration applies to patent licenses. Id. at 1334. In Rhone-Paulenc
Agro, the court examined the Heidelberg case and stressed that the protection
of the purchaser in good faith applies only to a transfer, whereas a nonexclusive license is not a transfer. Id. at 1330-31. But under special
circumstances, an exclusive licensee who has all the substantive rights of the
owner of the patent can be considered tantamount to a buyer. Id. at 1334. In
the case at hand, the rights did not include all the substantive rights, and
therefore the protection for a buyer in good faith and for consideration did not
apply. Id. The significance of the decision is that only an exclusive licensee,
who has all the substantive rights, can benefit from the protection for a buyer
in good faith and for consideration. Other approaches support the viewpoint
that the rule of the buyer in good faith and for consideration does not apply to
a license for a patent. Even with respect to subjects that are not related to
patent licenses, the case law has determined that the rule of the buyer in good
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As noted, the Indonesian law requires the registration of
licensing agreements with respect to trade secrets with the
Office of the Directorate General of Intellectual Property in the
Indonesian Ministry of Justice. After the deposit, a notice is
published regarding the transfer or the license in a special
gazette of trade secrets. The transfer or licensing of a trade
secret that is not documented with the Intellectual Property
Office is not valid with respect to third parties. But as noted, this
arrangement provides only a partial solution. Even if C knows
that A gave an exclusive license to B to use the trade secret, and
now A is offering C to acquire a license to use the trade secret,
claiming that it is a different trade secret, C cannot know that A
is deceiving him and is trying to give him a license for the same
trade secret to which B has already received an exclusive license.
Another problem occurs if C knows that B received a license for
a trade secret from A in the past, and now B proposes that C
purchase the trade secret, claiming that this is a different trade
secret. C cannot know that B is deceitful and that he is trying to
sell him a trade secret to which B holds only a license for use.
The difficulty with the Indonesian law is that the trade secrets
involved in transactions were not deposited with an objective
entity that could compare the trade secrets involved in
transactions in the past with the trade secrets offered in new
transactions by those who had been parties to the earlier
transactions. The trade secret registry that we propose requires
the deposit of the trade secrets that have been licensed, and
grants objective judicial authority to the trade secrets registrar
to make sure that another license has not been given for a trade
secret for which an exclusive license has already been granted,
and that the licensee did not sell the trade secret to another
entity.

faith and for consideration applies only to someone who acquired legal rights.
See Dykeman & Kopko, supra note 126. But I am of the opinion that within the
framework of the proposed trade secrets registry, the licensee of a trade secret
should be protected in case of erroneous registration of the owner of the secret,
so that he is liable to the real owner, but the circumstances of receiving the
license should grant discretion to the court to exempt the licensee who acted in
good faith and for consideration from remedies in various amounts.
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Registration of Collateral for a Trade Secret

The main asset of startup companies is their secret
information. At times, they have so much faith in the potential
of their initiative that they would prefer to take a loan for initial
financing and mortgage their trade secret, rather than sell
percentages of ownership, as they are forced to do at present. 133
The information era requires coordination between intellectual
property laws in general, and specifically between trade secrets
law and commercial financing law. This coordination is
essential during the stage of product development, when, in the
absence of a reasonable level of investment and financial
support, the ability to develop new information is lost. The
mortgaging of information is especially vital for companies
whose main asset is the secret information they own. It may be
assumed that an increase in the number of companies of this
nature will increase the need for the mortgaging of trade secrets.
It is therefore desirable to address the question of whether it is
possible and appropriate to mortgage a trade secret, and if yes,
what is the proper manner of doing it. To make the mortgaging
of information assets attractive, it is necessary to create a clear
law that reduces the risk a financier takes upon himself when
granting a loan in exchange for the mortgage of an intangible
asset, such that the cost of the mortgage is reduced.134
The mortgaging of a trade secret raises several difficulties
in the various stages of the transaction. (a) As noted,
professional financiers generally refuse to sign an advance
commitment to preserve confidentiality. This phenomenon is
similar to the Arrow disclosure paradox that manifests itself
during negotiations about the secret information. (b) In the
absence of proof of what the mortgaged trade secret is, the
professional financier is concerned that if the loan is not repaid
he will not be able to prove what constituted the content of the
mortgaged trade secret. (c) An additional risk is that the
founders and employees of the company may state that the trade
133. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
134. See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 48, at 195-200, 226. On the
importance of the ability to encumber trade secrets, see also Lars S. Smith,
Trade Secrets in Commercial Transactions and Bankruptcy, 40 IDEA: THE J.
L. & TECH. 549 (2000).
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secrets in their possession were developed only after they had
left the company, and therefore the collateral is not applicable
to them. (d) In most cases, a financier who has decided to invest
in a startup company (after having been persuaded of the
potential of the secret information in her possession, and of its
suitability to serve as collateral) will be interested in having the
collateral include the future development of the secret
information as well, because its value will be greater than the
initial secret information presently in the company’s possession,
at the initial stages of development. Hence, the need arises for
an efficient system, with sensible rules that can follow the
development of the secret information over time, so that the
mortgage applies to the development of the new information as
well, without creating a complicated mechanism that would
increase the transaction costs. (e) An additional problem
concerns the ability to separate and distinguish between the
owner’s various trade secrets if he wishes to mortgage only one
of them. If the mortgage agreement between the owner of the
secret and the financier includes only general definitions, it will
be difficult to distinguish later between the various secrets that
exist in similar business areas. A clear separation between the
assets that are mortgaged and those that are not mortgaged is
also important in the case of bankruptcy. (f) The value of the
collateral is determined according to several parameters: (i) the
existence of the mortgaged asset, proof of the mortgagor’s
ownership of the mortgaged asset, and the absence of a breach
of the rights of third parties; (ii) the ability of the owner of the
asset to protect his property; (iii) the ability of the owner of the
collateral to exercise of the mortgage. The proof of these
parameters is not simple. For example, the owner of the
collateral must ensure that it is possible to sell the trade secret
at the time it is realized without impairing its confidentiality,
and that it is possible to promise to the potential purchaser that
the debtor will not use the secret information or transfer it to
another party after the sale. (g) It must be practically possible
to ensure the rights of the owner of the collateral vis-à-vis third
parties. To make possible the mortgaging of trade secrets, it is
also necessary to create a system that would allow the
registration of the mortgages so that third parties can be
warned, and thus to grant the financier the standing of a secured
creditor. The standard registration systems of mortgages are not
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appropriate for the mortgaging of trade secrets that cannot, for
example, be listed in a registry open to the public. Because of the
many difficulties in the mortgaging of a trade secret, there are
few instances in which companies mortgage them despite the
advantages inherent in doing so, as noted above.135
In the U.S., the importance of the enabling mortgaging of a
trade secret has been recognized for some time, and therefore
the literature has attempted to address some of these problems.
Trade secrets may be mortgaged pursuant to Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C). To mortgage a trade secret,
it is necessary, among others, to sign an agreement and to
register a financing statement. Neither of these requires
providing details of the trade secret; it is sufficient to define it as
“general intangibles” or “trade secrets.”136 Two possibilities have
been proposed for maintaining confidentiality during
negotiations for the sale of the trade secret by the financier in
the event of realization of the collateral. One is requiring the
potential buyer to sign a confidentiality agreement, the other is
the blind acquisition of the secret.137 Regarding the ability to
sell the secret at the time of realization, the literature insists
that the former owner of the secret and the financier are bound
135. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. Regarding questions
and issues raised here, see also Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 48, at 200201, 204, 224-26; IP Audit Trail Services, supra note 14; IP Collateral and
Investment Protection Service, supra note 55. Clearly, it is not possible to create
a pawned mortgage in a trade secret, which requires that the asset leave the
possession of the debtor. Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 48, at 209;
PERRITT, supra note 39, at 303.
136. See In re Dillard Ford, Inc., 940 F.2d 1507, 1512 (11th Cir. 1991); In
re Boogie Enters., 866 F.2d. 1172 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Antenna
Sys. Inc., 251 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (D.N.H. 1966); PERRITT, supra note 39, at
302-309; Bramson, supra note 50, at 1578, 1589; Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra
note 48, at 209; see also In re James Cable Partners, 141 B.R. 772, 774 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1992) (quoting an agreement relating to a trade secret as being
covered as a type of general intangible entity); In re John Oliver Co., 91 B.R.
643, 644 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988) (quoting an agreement that explicitly referred
to a trade secret).
137. It is stated, for example, that a buyer wishing to purchase the
formula of Coca Cola is interested in doing so not because he saw the formula
and was convinced of its potential but because he is aware of the marketing
appeal of the drink based on the formula, and therefore it may be assumed that
the buyer will agree to purchase the formula even without seeing it before the
purchase. For this example and another one concerning a list of clients, see
PERRITT, supra note 39, at 310-11.
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by an explicit or implicit contractual duty not to use the secret
or to disclose it, although there are fewer enforcement and
deterrent measures with respect to the former owner of the
secret than with respect to the financier.138
Because the literature has made note of the vital need to
include in the framework of the mortgaging of information
assets the information developed after the creation of the
mortgage, some suggested classifying the new developments as
proceeds, making them subject to the rules provided in the
U.C.C., which regulate the applicability of collateral rights to
proceeds. This rule follows the proceeds received from the
original product and provides that a collateral right in the
original product is also valid as against the products that will be
derived from it in the future, but at the present it does not
include new research and development. The opinion has been
expressed in the literature that this rule can be expanded to
include new developments in the field of intellectual property.139
It may be possible to solve this issue by considering the
mortgaging of the new developments as a mortgage of a future
asset.140 But the solutions proposed in the literature present
several difficulties. The definition of the trade secret in the
mortgage agreement and in the registration framework as
“general intangibles” or as a “trade secret” and nothing more,
ignores the fact that often the financier is interested in the
existence of the content of the secret beyond its simple definition,
in order to prevent a situation in which, beyond the general
definition there is no formula as promised. Moreover, the
financier will want the possibility of proving specifically what
the secret is, if at the time of realization of the mortgage, there
is an argument about the content of the trade secret that was
mortgaged. Similarly, a general definition of “trade secret” will
make the mortgaging of a specific trade secret from among all of
138. The former owner of the secret, who is disappointed with the failure
of his business, is more likely to breach his obligation. Id. at 311-14.
139. Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 48, at 224, 226 (citing In re
Transp. Design & Tech., Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 641 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985)). A rule
requiring a commercial entity to re-register rights to new information, which
was developed with existing technology and which is subject to an existing
security agreement, will cause unnecessary costs without bringing any obvious
benefits. Id. at 227.
140. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203, 9-204(a), 9-502(d) (1977).
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the borrower’s trade secrets problematic.
The proposed trade secret registry can assist with the
difficulties discussed above. As part of the negotiations for
receiving a loan, the owner of the secret can disclose the secret
to the financier with greater confidence if he has registered the
secret with the proposed registry before the negotiations, similar
to registering the secret before negotiations for its sale, as
discussed in Section D, supra. In this manner, the negotiations
can go forward even if the financier refuses to sign a
confidentiality agreement in advance. After the consent to
finance is given, it is possible to prepare a mortgage agreement
that includes the lender’s commitment to maintain
confidentiality. An additional problem arises because of the
lender’s desire to have proof of the content of the trade secret in
order to forestall argument at the time of realization of the
mortgage. Because the owner of the secret often does not trust
the lender’s ability to maintain the confidentiality of the
information and to take appropriate security measures, and the
lender, on his part, is not willing to transact the mortgage
without proof of the nature of the mortgaged trade secret, a
difficulty arises that the registry can help solve.
The parties can register the trade secret in the registry in
such a way that the borrower is registered as the owner and the
lender as the owner of the mortgaged information. The
registered trade secret cannot be erased by its owner. This type
of mortgage is appropriate for trade secrets that, by nature, are
not supposed to change and develop, such as chemical formulas,
but it is not appropriate for a trade secret that is continually
developing. Most trade secrets, however, are not frozen and
continue to be developed. As noted, the lender is usually
prepared to accept the trade secret as collateral, on condition
that the security applies to the continued developments. This
subject has raised a great deal of difficulty in the literature.
Indeed, it requires a system of sensible rules that can follow the
developing asset and apply the collateral to it. It needs to enable
the financier to prove, at the time of realization, what the
updated trade secret is, and to make it possible to distinguish
between various trade secrets of the owner of the secret when he
mortgages only some of them.
The proposed trade secret registry provides a solution to
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these problems. In the previous part, I noted that the employer
has several incentives to register his trade secrets with the
registry so that his employees become registered as subject to
the trade secrets exposed to them or developed by them in the
course of their work. Employers who do not carry out this
registration and do not update the registration of the developing
trade secrets will not be able to request an ex ante order
restraining occupation, and will take the risk that their
employees will be able to sell their trade secrets to third parties
(as discussed below). The mortgage of the company’s trade
secrets registered with the registry for the purpose of identifying
those who are subject to them makes possible dynamic
mortgaging of the trade secrets developed over time and
cyclically updated. But because at issue is a trade secret for
which the company is supposed to update registration on a daily
basis, there is concern that instead of updating the registration
as development continues, the company will empty the mortgage
of all significance by erasing it when the moment of truth comes.
To address this problem, the following arrangements are
proposed. If a company mortgages its trade secrets, which are
updated daily in the registry with respect to its employees, the
updates do not replace any previous updates but are appended
to the previous updates, which are saved with a date stamp,
indicating the date on which they were recorded. The owner of
the mortgage can inspect the updated secret information at all
times. This arrangement ensures that even if the company finds
that at some point it may not be able to make payments on the
loan, and therefore stops updating the registry, the financier can
exercise the mortgage based on the near-latest version of the
trade secret. The financier’s right to view the registration allows
him to ascertain that updates are being carried out while the
mortgage is in effect. A failure to update the registry will enable
the financier to exercise the mortgage based on the most recent
update registered. Because the financier agreed to give the loan
on the basis of the original version of the secret, he will not incur
great damage by the failure to adhere to the planned updating,
and will redeem the mortgage based on the original trade secret
or on the latest update that was registered.
The right to see the mortgaged trade secret which is
registered, together with the sanction of realization of the
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mortgage in the absence of periodic updating, enables the
creation of a dynamic mortgage in cases in which the original
registration was not intended only to serve public notice of the
fact that the employees are subject to it, but also in usual cases
in which the owner of a trade secret wants to mortgage his
secret. The sanction of realization of the mortgage in the
absence of updates provides incentives to the owner of the secret
to update the registry. When the update is not tied to the
relationship of the owner of the secret with his employees, there
is a risk that the owner of the secret would update the registry
inaccurately in a way that the financier might not be able to
discover. But because the previous versions are saved, the
financier can exercise the mortgage according to the initial
version, based on which he agreed to provide the loan. Saving
the registration in this manner is more expensive but has
another practical advantage. If information is backed up in such
a way that each update does not erase the previous update, and
all the updates are saved with the timestamp of registration,
information that has changed can be recreated if there is a need
to review the information created in the past or that has changed
in the course of development.
To make the mortgage valid vis-à-vis third parties acting in
good faith, double registration is necessary. One registration is
made in the mortgage registry pursuant to Article 9 of the
U.C.C., where it is registered that the owner mortgaged a trade
secret to the benefit of the financier, deposited in box X in the
trade secret registry. The second registration is in the trade
secret registry, where the owner is registered as the owner of the
trade secret in box X, and the financier is registered as the owner
of the mortgage.141 It may be desirable, however, to adopt the
model of exclusive registration of the mortgage in the trade
secret registry. In accordance with the law applicable to the
trade secret registry, mortgaging of a trade secret at a time when
it is not registered will be void for any purchaser, mortgagee, or
licensee who registered in good faith and for consideration,
unless the mortgage was registered in the registry within three
months from the date of its creation or before the date of the

141. Double registration is also needed with respect to mortgaging a
patent. See generally Einhorn, supra note 51.

73

528

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:2

purchase, mortgage, or license.142 Additionally, a mortgage of a
trade secret that was registered takes preference over a previous
buyer, an owner of mortgage, and a licensee who did not register
their rights.143
In previous parts, I noted that private escrow companies
already enable the deposit of trade secrets for the purpose of
mortgaging them to investors. As part of this service, the secret
information cannot be erased, and therefore the lender can rely
on the secret information as a pledge, without concern that the
trade secret will disappear. Dating of the deposit of information
prevents an allegation on the part of the owners of the company
or its employees that the secret information in their possession
was created after they had left the company and that thus the
mortgage does not apply to them. Tying the mortgage to the
secret information deposited in a specific box in the escrow
company can address the problem of the separation and
distinction between the trade secrets of the owner of the secret,
if he wishes to mortgage only one trade secret. The periodic
deposit of developing trade secrets with the escrow company as
security for a loan creates a dynamic mortgage that applies to
the developing secret.
But this service has two main problems. To receive priority
relative to other creditors, the security must be registered in the
mortgage registry, and there must be an incentive for the
borrowing companies to update the secret deposited as collateral
for the loan. The proposed trade secret registry, as a statutory
body, also serves as a source of referrals for registries of
mortgages or as the exclusive registry in which the mortgage is
registered. It also creates incentives for the owner of the secret
142. This is similar to the law applicable to the unregistered transfer of
ownership of a patent. See supra note 52. Indeed, with respect to patents,
section 261 is not applicable to a mortgage that was not registered but rather
to transfers of ownership that were not registered, see supra note 126, and it is
also inapplicable to the licensee, see supra note 127. But as stated, this stems
from the wording of section 261, and there is no reason not to apply the rule to
this case as well.
143. It is true that with respect to patents, section 261 applies to anyone
who receives a mortgage in good faith and for consideration as against a
previous transfer of ownership that was not registered, and not to a mortgage
and license that were not registered. But, as stated, this stems from the
wording of section 261, and there is no rationale for not applying the rule in
these cases as well.
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to update the registration, as noted above.
In cases in which the owner of the secret has several
registered trade secrets, the trade secrets registrar makes sure
that the mortgage is registered on the registered trade secret for
which the mortgage agreement was created. Thus, the register
enables a buyer, licensee, or secured creditor to ensure that they
receive rights with respect to a trade secret to which no previous
rights have been registered, and to know what the trade secret
is that is the subject of their rights. This solution, however, is
not satisfactory for regular creditors of the owner of the secret,
because they will not be able to know whether the main trade
secrets of the owner of the secret are pledged, or only trade
secrets that are secondary in importance.144 This appears to
infringe on the rights of regular creditors, but these creditors do
not generally rely on the registration of a particular asset as a
source for collecting their debts because the rights to such asset
are likely to change in the future.
The proposed registry can also assist in determining the
value of the collateral that was established, as noted above,
based on several parameters: (a) The existence of the mortgaged
asset, proof of the mortgagor’s ownership of the mortgaged asset,
and the absence of a breach of the rights of third parties. The
registry allows the disclosure of the secret to a financier in order
for him to be assured of its existence, to verify that it is suitable
for a trade secret, and to estimate its value. The registry
increases certainty regarding the ownership of the mortgagor
with respect to the trade secret and decreases the risk of
violation of rights of third parties, even if it does not absolutely
prevent such violations. (b) The ability of the owner of the secret
144. See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra, note 48, at 226. Apparently, it
would have been possible to consider requiring that a general description of
the secret would be provided in the mortgage notice so that the creditor could
distinguish between the various mortgaged secrets. This option does not
appear to be desirable at first glance. (a) The fact that someone is engaged in
a particular activity can be information he may not wish to disclose to the
public. (b) As there is no external entity to check the accuracy of the description
at the time of registration (because this is a registry of transactions and not a
registry of rights), it could be a source for fraud. (c) The initial description of a
trade secret is not always relevant for the continued development of the secret,
and we wish to make registration easy and not require the registrant to update
the description each time the secret is updated. (d) A general description can
be vague and cause lack of clarity.
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to protect his property. In the previous parts I described how the
proposed trade secret registry assists in preventing trade secret
misappropriation by former employees, former sellers, and
licensees.145 (c) The ability of the owner of the security to realize
the pledge: the proposed registry would also assist in the sale of
the trade secret at the time of realization, pursuant to the rules
of sale, as noted above.
In view of the above, the proposed arrangement makes the
use of a trade secret as collateral for a loan more efficient, and
thus reduces the financing costs and the interest offered to the
borrower.
G. The Liability of the Registry to the Owner of the Secret
As stated in Section B, supra, the concern that companies
and individuals may be apprehensive about depositing trade
secrets with the proposed registry is not justified in the present
reality in which companies deposit secrets with escrow
companies and backup sites.
Nevertheless, to increase
confidence in the use of the registry and to reduce the risk by
spreading the damage in the event that the registry is broken
into with the intent of stealing the deposited trade secrets, the
registry can provide the option of an insurance against breaking
into the registry, the misappropriation of trade secrets, forgery,
fraud, etc. It is also possible to establish an insurance fund to
compensate for damages likely to be incurred as a result of the
use of the registry, such as compensation for damage caused by
the trade secret registry. Such a fund could be financed by the
registration fees. Similar systems are in use in various types of
lands registries.146 Operators of the registry would bear liability
in such events, among others, for breach of contract and torts of
negligence. The liability of an outside party in the event of
breaking the encryption may be based, among others, on the
torts of trade secret misappropriation and of unjust enrichment.

145. In the previous parts, I discussed the contribution of the registry to
improving the control of the owner of the secret over his property, which is
necessary for appraisal of the property and its ability to serve as a security.
See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 48, at 195-200, 226.
146. E. DOWSON & V.L. SHEPPARD, LAND REGISTRATION 79, 124 (1952).
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H. An International Trade Secrets Registry
The efficiency of the proposed registry would increase if it
operated as an international registry. The global village of today
stems, among other things, from the technological and cultural
developments that have increased the mobility of information
and of employees. The mobility of these resources has made
possible the flourishing of international companies that employ
workers in many countries. Another recent phenomenon is the
increase in the number of international transactions in
information in general and in secret information in particular.
This increase reflects the transformation of the commercial
market, especially the global market of ideas and opinions.
These phenomena are important components of the
globalization process.147
The advantages of the registry as a tool that publicizes the
identity of the owners of rights to trade secrets and those
subordinate to them, and as a tool that limits the litigation costs
and reduces the cost of transactions in rights to trade secrets,
are even more vital for international companies and for
transactions that have international elements. Currently, many
countries provide protection for rights to trade secrets.148 But
the laws of trade secrets and those addressing related
transactions are not the same in the various countries that
protect these rights. These differences create an artificial
barrier that hampers international companies dealing in secret
information and international transactions in secret
information.
International commercial activity requires
international legal arrangements that reduce the uncertainty
resulting from the lack of uniformity in national laws. Given the
efficiency of international arrangements, it makes sense to
create a unified international registry. For the registry to
147. Regarding globalization in a context of legal theory, see William
Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory: Some Local Implications, 49
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1 (1996).
148. Bramson, supra note 50, at 1574. For a broad survey of trade secrets
law in many countries, see COHEN & GUTTERMAN, supra note 8, at 413-16 and
2000 Supplement, at 59-80; 1 WORLD WIDE TRADE SECRETS LAW (Terrence F.
MacLaren ed., West Group, Dec., 2002). For a survey of the differences in the
laws in the states of the United States, see TRADE SECRETS: A STATE-BY-STATE
SURVEY (Brian M. Malsberger et al., eds., 1997).
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operate in the international arena, it is necessary to resolve the
question of choice of law, so that the registry can operate based
on uniform procedural and substantive laws. An additional
problem has to deal with the protection of intellectual property,
which by nature enjoys territorial protection. One of the
objectives of conventions in the field of intellectual property is to
make it easier to gain as broad a territorial protection as
possible. A detailing of the various types of conventions in this
field is beyond the scope of the present paper. There is no doubt,
however, that the aspiration is to create a unified, international,
global registry for each type of registered intellectual property,
both from the procedural point of view (establishing a single
international registry that would provide protection in every
country that joins the arrangement and would replace the
national registries), and from the point of view of substantive
law, by enacting a uniform law in these countries.149
Establishing an international trade secret registry will
encounter fewer difficulties than establishing an international
registry in other areas of intellectual property, such as patents,
designs, trademarks and geographic indications. In these areas
of intellectual property, a preliminary examination is required
before registration to determine whether the requirements for
registration are met and to ascertain the identity of the owner of
the intellectual property.
The conventions dealing with
international arrangements must create a mechanism for
communicating with the national offices for registration or
serving as a substitute for them. This problem does not arise for
the registry for trade secrets. In the case of the proposed
registry, there is no need to conduct a preliminary examination
of the information being registered. Moreover, the conventions
concerning other types of intellectual property must overcome
their territorial nature. This problem does not arise in the case
of the protection of trade secrets because the protection is not
territorial. A person is not entitled to use a trade secret without

149. For a prediction about the likelihood of such a registry being
established in the field of patents, see Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo,
World Patent System Circa 20xx, A.D., 38 IDEA: THE J. L. & TECH. 529, 547
(1998); see also Amir H. Khoury, The End of the National Patent Office, 52
IDEA: THE J. L. & TECH. 197 (2012).
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the consent of its owner, not even in another country.150
For the trade secret registry to operate as an international
registry the issue of the uniformity of the law in the various
countries must be addressed. In order to create uniformity in
the law it will be possible to create an international convention
for the operation of the trade secret registry could achieve the
required uniformity and establish the rules according to which
the registry should operate as a sole international registry,
taking into account the substantive trade secrets law.151 The
convention would issue a uniform law, including a binding
version, which each party state would have to enact as its
national law, so that the laws of the convention would replace
the national trade secrets laws.152
VIII. Conclusion
In the introduction, I noted that most of the researchers who
have discussed the efficiency of the two main systems of
protection of inventions, patents and trade secrets, have arrived

150. For the problems created at the interface between the registry and
the territorial jurisdiction regarding real property and chattels, see also Baird
& Jackson, supra note 74, at 310-11. The authors also address registries for
patents, copyright, and trademarks, but not their international aspects.
151. Where there is no uniformity in the law regarding the various
transactions, many difficulties can arise. For example, Bramson recommends
that someone accepting a security that is a trade secret should check whether
there are foreign rights involved, and if such rights exist, to examine the law
in the foreign countries conferring such rights and the rules according to which
it is necessary to act in order to complete a security interest with respect to
such rights. See Bramson, supra note 50, at 1573.
152. This is the method that was used in the Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, April 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3. The law that
was enacted following the convention has already been adopted by many
countries; therefore it achieves the objective of creating a uniform
international law with respect to the determination of the rights and
obligations of sellers and buyers in international sales transactions. Another
example of a convention that established international registries of rights with
respect to assets, including the substantive laws that apply to such rights, is
the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001,
2307 U.N.T.S. 285, which established international registries for the rights
and transactions related to aircraft, trains, and space equipment. But no
international registries for trains and space equipment have been established
yet because the relevant protocols have not yet been ratified by the required
number of states.
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at the conclusion that these are complementary systems, i.e., in
some cases the inventor should choose the patent system and in
other cases the trade secrets method. In most cases, the choice
depends on the nature of the invention and the circumstances of
the case.153 In the first four parts I showed that patents are
preferable to trade secrets in four main aspects: patents lower
litigation costs, transaction costs, financing costs, and
employment costs. As part of the analysis of the proposed trade
secret registry, I demonstrated how it would reduce litigation
costs in cases of trade secret misappropriation by a former
employee. I also showed how the proposed registry reduces the
costs of transactions involving trade secrets (sale, licensing, and
collaterals). The registry would dramatically improve the
marketability of trade secrets and reduce the risk associated
with market transactions. According to Professor Robert
Merges, “in the presence of high transaction costs, industry
participants have an incentive to invest in institutions that
lower the costs of IPR exchange.”154 The proposed trade secret
registry achieves this objective.
Financing costs would also be lower as the registry would
make it possible to use the trade secret as collateral for a loan.
The proposed registry would also make the misappropriation of
trade secrets by former employees more difficult, and in this way
it can reduce employment costs and prevent the unlawful
mobility of information. These advantages are consistent with
one of the most important rationales for the existence of a right
to trade secrets: promoting business ethics and fair
competition.155

153. See supra note 4 and the accompanying text.
154. Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual
Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2655 (1994).
155. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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